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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is invoked in 
this matter pursuant to Section §78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code 
Anotated 1953, as amended. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2) (h) (1953) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON 
APPEAL: 
I. Issues: 
A. Whether Mr. Lovato should be estopped from attempting to 
relitigate the facts of this case before the Utah Court of 
Appeals? 
Whether the trial court erred when it found that: 
B. Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay and should pay alimony 
to Ms. Lovato. 
C. Mr. Lovato has the ability to pay and should pay the 
6 
attorney's fees of both parties. 
D. In its judgement, Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital 
residence should bear an interest rate. 
E. Half of the insurance proceeds from a house fire should 
be awarded to Ms. Lovato because these insurance proceeds 
are a marital asset. 
II. Standards of Review: 
A. When challenging an allegedly erroneous application of 
law to facts, the factual findings themselves must 
necessarily be accepted as uncontested. Sierra Club v. Utah 
Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 341 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 
B. "It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the 
trial court's distribution of property and award of alimony 
in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is shown/' Hiqley v. Hiqley, 676 P.2d 379, 
382 (Utah 1983)(quoting Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 
(Utah 1982)). 
C. "Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 . . . gives trial courts the 
power to award attorney fees in divorce actions. Both the 
decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees 
7 
are within the sound discretion of the court/' Rappleve v. 
Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
D. "Determining and assigning values to marital property is 
a matter for the trial court, and this Court will not 
disturb those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse 
of discretion/' Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 
563 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Morgan II)). 
E. "It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the 
trial court's distribution of property and award of alimony 
in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is shown/' Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 
382 (Utah 1983)(quoting Doritv v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 
(Utah 1982)). Furthermore, the trial court's duty to make 
an equitable distribution of property in a divorce action 
encompasses all assets of every kind; and this includes any 
insurance. Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949 P.2d 
779, 783 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Statement of the Case: 
8 
Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. Mr. Lovato 
sued Ms. Lovato for divorce. The action was tried before 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring beginning on September 3, 
1999. Judge Nehring entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and thereafter issued a Divorce Decree 
and its succeeding modification. In his decision, Judge 
Nehring ordered, interalia, the distribution of the Lovatos' 
marital property and the award of alimony to Ms. Lovato. 
Also included in Judge Nehring's decision was the award of 
attorney fees, interest on the equity of the marital home 
and one-half of the fire insurance proceeds protecting the 
marital home to Ms. Lovato. Despite Mr. Lovato's claim that 
he is disputing Judge Nehring's application of the law to 
the facts, in reality Mr. Lovato is attempting to relitigate 
the facts of this case before the Utah Court of Appeals.1 
Course of the Proceedings: 
1. On October 9, 1997, Mr. Lovato filed a divorce action 
1
 See both a copy of Petitioner's Objections to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree attached herewith and 
subsequent Section of this Brief designated "Course of the 
Proceedings." 
9 
against Ms. Lovato in the Third District Court in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Ms. Lovato answered and counterclaimed on October 30, 
1997. 
3. An Order for Bifurcation and a Decree of Divorce was 
entered on May 4, 1998.2 
4. The action was tried before the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring on September 3, 8, 10 and 30, 1999.3 
5. Judge Nehring found for Ms. Lovato on issues regarding 
alimony, attorney fees, and interest on the equity of the 
marital home and awarded Ms. Lovato one-half of fire 
insurance proceeds intended to protect the marital home.4 
6. On October 25, 1999, Mr. Lovato filed his Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce 
Decree with the trial court.5 
7. The Court rejected Mr. Lovato's Objections on November 4, 
2
 See page 1 of copy of Divorce Decree attached herewith adopted by 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring after Judge Nehring received 
evidence, heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses and 
reviewed the exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings. 
3
 See Trial Record. 
4
 See Judge's Ruling pages 6-9, 10, 6 and 5 respectively. 
5
 See copy of Petitioner's Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and to Divorce Decree attached herewith. 
10 
1999.6 
8. Mr. Lovato filed a Motion for a New Trial or to Correct 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree 
on November 11, 1999.7 
9. The Court denied Mr. Lovato's Motion on March 23, 2000.8 
10. Mr. Lovato filed a Notice of Appeal and a Cost Bond on 
April 18, 2000.9 
Disposition at Trial Court: 
The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring ruled in favor of Ms. Lovato 
on all of the foregoing issues. Judge Nehring ordered Mr. 
Lovato to pay alimony to Ms. Lovato.10 Judge Nehring also 
ordered Mr. Lovato to pay the attorney's fees of both 
parties.11 Judge Nehring next awarded Ms. Lovato a $10,223 
judgement against Mr. Lovato in exchange for her equity 
interest accrued in the marital residence during the 
6
 See Minute Entry attached herewith. 
77 See Petitioner's Motion for New Trial or to Correct Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree. 
8
 See Minute Entry attached herewith. 
9
 See Petitioner's Notice of Appeal. 
10
 Id. at pages 9-14. See also copy of Divorce Decree at pages 10-
13. 
11
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 14. See also copy of Amended 
Divorce Decree at page 15. 
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parties' marriage.12 Given the following facts, Judge 
Nehring ordered that Ms. Lovato's equity in the martial 
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is 
entitled to recover one-half of fire insurance proceeds 
collected by Mr. Lovato from an insurance company after a 
fire occurred in the marital property in 1998.13 This Court 
should affirm the trial court's rulings on these issues. 
Summary of Relevant Facts: 
This Appeal Is Another Example Of Mr. Lovato's Abuse Of Ms. 
Lovato Which Has Continued Unabated Throughout Their 
Divorce: 
Mr. Lovato sued Ms. Lovato for divorce in the Third 
District Court in Salt Lake County on October 9, 1997. Mr. 
and Ms. Lovato had been married for thirteen years. Ms. 
Lovato answered and counterclaimed. An Order for 
Bifurcation and Decree of Divorce was entered on May 4, 
1998, before any valuation of the marital estate was made. 
The divorce action was tried before the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring beginning on September 3, 1999. The following 
12
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9. See also copy of Amended 
Divorce Decree at pages 6-7, para 25. 
13
 See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 9-10. See also copy of 
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 7-8. 
12 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were adopted by the 
court after Judge Nehring received evidence, heard the 
testimony of the parties and witnesses and reviewed the 
exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings. 
Alimony: 
Mr, Lovato was determined to be the primary income earner 
throughout the parties' marriage.14 Mr. Lovato was also 
determined to have a longer employment history and more 
marketable job skills than Ms. Lovato does and, at age 
forty-five, to be in the prime income earning stage of his 
career.15 Mr. Lovato is employed by the Salt Lake County 
Corporation and earns a gross salary of $3,253 per month and 
a net salary of $2643.09 per month.16 In addition, Mr. 
Lovato regularly supplemented his income during the marriage 
through his work at an auto body shop.17 Ms. Lovato, on the 
other hand, earns only a net salary of $1,797.71 per month, 
after entering the work force full-time for the first time 
14
 See page 5 of copy of Divorce Decree attached herewith adopted by 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring after Judge Nehring received 
evidence, heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses and 
reviewed the exhibits, pleadings and file in these proceedings. 
15
 Id. at 11. 
16




since the marriage.18 Included in this amount is the family 
income Ms. Lovato supplemented through her occasional 
operation of a craft booth business.19 Additional facts also 
support Judge Nehring's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato. 
At the time of trial, Ms. Lovato's living expenses were 
determined to be artificially low.20 She had been living 
with family members and friends because of Mr. Lovato's 
refusal to pay temporary alimony throughout the pendency of 
this action.21 As a result, Ms. Lovato's visitation with her 
children suffered.22 For these and other reasons, the court 
found that Mr. Lovato has more flexibility than Ms. Lovato 
does with which to reduce expenses.23 
Judge Nehring ordered an offset of the reciprocal 
payments owed by both of the parties to each other based on 
the facts of the case. Ms. Lovato has continued to pay 
child support to Mr. Lovato throughout the pendency of this 
action and has no arrearage due.24 Mr. Lovato, on the other 
18
 Id^ at 10. 
19
 Id. at 9-10. 
20
 Id. at 11. See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 12. 
21




 Id. See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 12. 
24
 Id. at 3. 
14 
hand, refused to pay any temporary alimony during the 
pendency of this action and has filed for bankruptcy.25 Mr. 
Lovato was deemed responsible for the assumption of the 
parties' marital debts and financial obligations.26 However, 
assumption of this financial responsibility was intended to 
be in lieu of additional spousal support and, thus, non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy.27 Furthermore, the court 
specifically found that Mr. Lovato's obligation to assist in 
Ms. Lovato's support took precedence over Mr. Lovato's 
obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy because Mr. Lovato 
would not currently be in possession of the marital 
residence and additional marital property had it not been 
for Ms. Lovato's efforts during the marriage.28 For these 
reasons, an offset was ordered.29 
Attorney's Fees: 
Judge Nehring also ordered Mr. Lovato to pay the attorney's 
fees of both parties because of the specific facts of this 
25




 Id. See also copy of Appellant's Explanation of his Bankruptcy 
Discharge in a Chapter 7 Case, Form B18 page 2, attached herewith. 
28
 See Amended Divorce Decree at page 13. 
29
 Id. at 13-14. 
15 
case. This action has been made unnecessarily lengthy and 
time consuming because of Mr. Lovato's actions.30 Mr. Lovato 
has consistently refused all of Ms. Lovato's settlement 
offers and ongoing efforts to resolve this action. 
Furthermore, the court specifically found that Mr. Lovato is 
in a better financial position than Ms. Lovato to pay the 
attorney's fees incurred as a result of this drawn-out 
action. 
Equity and Fire Insurance Proceeds From the Marital 
Residence: 
Judge Nehring also awarded Ms. Lovato a $15,000 judgement 
against Mr. Lovato in exchange for her equity interest 
accrued in the marital residence during the parties' 
marriage.31 "Respondent should be awarded judgement against 
Petitioner in the amount of $15,000 . . ."32 If Mr. Lovato 
was able to satisfy Ms. Lovato's judgement interest within 
thirty days after trial, Mr. Lovato would then have been 
30
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 14. See also Appellant's Brief 
at page 29. See also "Course of the Proceedings" Section of 
Appellee's Brief at pages 5-6. 
31
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9. 
32
 Id. This amount was later readjusted to $10,223.00, although this 
amount still represents 50% of the equity in the marital home. See 
copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 6-7, para 25. 
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awarded sole ownership of the property.33 In addition, Ms. 
Lovato was acknowledged to be entitled to recoup one-half of 
fire insurance proceeds collected by Mr. Lovato from an 
insurance company after a fire occurred in the marital 
residence in 1998.34 These insurance proceeds were 
determined to be a marital asset, but Mr. Lovato testified 
at trial that he had spent most of this money on his own 
personal living expenses.35 Given the foregoing facts, Judge 
Nehring ordered that Ms. Lovato's equity in the martial 
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is 
entitled to recover one-half of these fire insurance 
proceeds.36 
Summary of the Argument: 
Mr. Lovato should be estopped from attempting to relitigate 
the facts of this case before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
When challenging an allegedly erroneous application of law 




 Id. at 10. 
35
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 7. 
36
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 7-8. 
17 
be accepted as uncontested.37 Mr. Lovato claims to be 
contesting the trial court's application of the law to the 
facts.38 However, a review of Mr. Lovato's brief reveals 
that his legal arguments are, in reality, a guise for 
factual disputes. Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's legal arguments 
fail to identify error by the trial court or to provide any 
meaningful legal analysis.39 Therefore, Mr. Lovato's legal 
challenge should be rejected in its entirety. 
Mr. Lovato's legal arguments lack merit. The evidence 
with respect to the award of alimony was voluminous in this 
case.40 Mr. Lovato's arguments regarding an offset and 
equalizing the standards of living of the parties' are 
similarly flawed. The trial court's judgement was correct in 
determining that Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital 
residence should bear an interest rate and that she is also 
entitled to one-half of insurance proceeds from a fire in 
the marital home. Finally, since this appeal lacks merit, 
37
 Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd.. 964 P.2d 
335, 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
38
 See Appellant's Brief at page 3. 
39
 See State v. Price, 827 P. 2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See 
also State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (court may 
decline to address arguments without merit on appeal). 
40
 See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 10-13. See also copy of 
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14. 
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the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato 
should be affirmed and she should be entitled to recover 
additional attorney's fees for the costs of this appeal. 
Argument: 
Mr. Lovato Should Be Estopped From Attempting To Relitigate 
The Facts Of This Case Before The Utah Court Of Appeals: 
This Court should estop Mr. Lovato from attempting to 
relitigate the facts of this case before the Utah Court of 
Appeals. "It is well settled that this Court will not 
disturb the trial court's distribution of property and award 
of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown."41 Mr. Lovato 
claims to be contesting the trial court's application of the 
law to the facts.42 However, a review of Mr. Lovato's brief 
reveals that his legal arguments are, in reality, a guise 
for factual disputes. For example, much of Mr. Lovato's 
brief supplies mathematical "corrections" to the amounts 
arrived at by the trial court after receiving evidence from 
41
 Hialev v.Hialey, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dority v. 
Doritv, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982)). 
42
 See Appellant Brief at page 3 . 
19 
the parties.43 Since Mr. Lovato's legal arguments are, in 
reality, factual disputes, this Court should estop Mr. 
Lovato from further abusing both Ms. Lovato and the judicial 
system. 
Mr. Lovato's other legal arguments reveal the same fatal 
flaw: in actuality, they are factual disputes. Many of Mr. 
Lovato's legal arguments can be reduced to a disagreement 
with economies of scale.44 Mr. Lovato continues to live in 
the marital home with the two teen-aged children. Ms. 
Lovato, on the other hand, must now obtain separate and 
suitable housing for herself so that she can be capable of 
fulfilling her parental responsibilities.45 Mr. Lovato's 
disagreement with economies of scale is a factual dispute 
and not a legal argument. 
Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's legal argument that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial court's 
rulings46 reveals that Mr. Lovato's real disagreement lies 
43
 IdL at 16-18, 21-22, 31. 
44
 Id. at page 13, final para, page 14, first para, and page 22, n.7, 
all comparing the living expenses of the parties. 
45
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12. See also copy of Amended 
Divorce Decree at page 11. 
46
 See Appellant's Brief at pages 10, 28, and 29. 
20 
not with the trial court, but with the evidence itself. For 
example, despite the specific factual findings made by the 
trial court to the contrary, Mr. Lovato continues to argue 
that he lacks the ability to pay alimony.47 Further, Mr. 
Lovato persists in arguing the amount of his transportation 
expenses, despite the trial court's specific finding that 
Mr. Lovato could reduce his transportation expenses.48 Mr. 
Lovato also continues to argue the amount of tax that should 
be deducted from his income, despite the trial court's 
specific accounting of the amount of tax that should 
properly be deducted from Mr. Lovato's income.49 In a 
nutshell, Mr. Lovato's legal arguments fail to identify 
error by the trial court or to provide any meaningful 
factual or legal analysis.50 Therefore, Mr. Lovato has 
fallen far short of his burden to show a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
47
 Compare Appellant's Brief at page 11 with copy of Divorce Decree 
at pages 10 and 11. See also copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 
11, para 41. 
48
 Compare Appellant's Brief at page 12 with copy of Amended Divorce 
Decree at page 12, para 44. 
49
 Compare Appellant's Brief at page 17 with copy of Amended Divorce 
Decree at page 11, para 42. 
50
 State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See also 
State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to 
address arguments without merit on appeal). 
21 
Finally, since Mr. Lovato's legal arguments make evident 
his bad faith, this Court should reject Mr. Lovato's 
appellate brief in its entirety. For example, Mr. Lovato 
incorrectly characterizes the trial court's award of alimony 
to Ms. Lovato as the trial court's legal conclusion that 
funds are available from child support as a source of 
payment for alimony.51 Mr. Lovato has propounded this 
argument to this Court despite the fact that Judge Nehring 
specifically clarified to Mr. Lovato that this is an 
incorrect characterization of his legal conclusions.52 Mr. 
Lovato also incorrectly characterizes the trial court's 
alimony award as being based solely on the parties' income 
disparity.53 Mr. Lovato's incorrect characterizations of the 
trial court's rulings constitute bad faith. 
Mr. Lovato's incorrect characterizations of the trial 
court's rulings are also counter to the trial court's 
specific factual findings. Mr. Lovato contends that, "The 
children should not be required to suffer in order to permit 
51
 See Appellant's Brief at page 14. 
52
 See copy of Judge Nehring's Minute Entry dated March 23, 2000. 
53
 Compare Appellant's Brief at page 29 with copy of Divorce Decree 
at pages 10-13 and copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14. 
22 
Ms. Lovato to have a higher standard of living."54 Mr. 
Lovato propounds this argument to this Court despite the 
fact that the trial court specifically found that Mr. Lovato 
has the ability to both increase his income and reduce his 
expenses.55 Mr. Lovato could also certainly cease his 
wasteful use of the judicial system's scarce resources.56 
Mr. Lovato's manipulation of the interests of his children 
for this purpose is particularly tragic in light of the fact 
that Mr. Lovato has refused to pay temporary alimony to Ms. 
Lovato and this has caused the children's visitation with 
Ms. Lovato to suffer.57 In summary, Mr. Lovato's brief makes 
evident the broad extent of Mr. Lovato's bad faith. 
Therefore, this Court should reject Mr. Lovato's brief in 
its entirety. 
Alimony: 
Sufficiency of the Evidence: 
As argued above, Mr. Lovato's actual dispute is not with the 
54
 See Appellant's Brief at page 29. 
55
 See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 11-12. See also copy of 
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 12-13, para 44. 
56
 See "Course of the Proceedings" and "Summary of Relevant Facts" 
Sections of this Brief. See also copy of Divorce Decree at page 14. 
See also Appellant's Brief at page 29. 
57
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12, para 39. 
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sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, Mr. Lovato is 
attempting to dispute the evidence itself at the appellate 
level. The trial court reviewed voluminous evidence in this 
divorce action before reaching its decision.58 After 
reviewing all the evidence, the trial court entered very 
detailed factual findings with respect to the alimony issue. 
Mr. Lovato has simply failed to carry his burden to show any 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.59 In Coleman v. 
Coleman, the husband in that case also had "failed to rebut 
the presumption that he had the ability to pay alimony as 
ordered by the court and the court was not in error in 
finding defendant in contempt on that basis."60 This Court 
should affirm the trial court's alimony award. 
Contrary to Mr. Lovato's argument, an abuse of 
discretion would have resulted had the trial court awarded 
Ms. Lovato a lower alimony amount. In 1983, the Utah 
58
 See "Course of Proceedings" Section of this Brief. See also Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a) and Richie v. Richie, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), both addressing the unique position of the trial court 
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 
59
 Higlev v.Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dority v. 
Dority. 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982))._ 
60
 Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1983). The Court in 
this case also found that federal bankruptcy statutes did not 
preclude the state district court from entering a money judgement 
for delinquent support payments. Id. at 1158. 
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Supreme Court in Higley determined that the award of 
permanent alimony to the wife in that case of only $100 per 
month constituted a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion because the award amount was too low.61 In that 
case, the wife was forty-seven years old, had a high-school 
degree and no income.62 Furthermore, her efforts as a 
homemaker enabled her husband to build a career as an 
aircraft welder.63 The husband was also able as a result of 
her efforts to work on occasional welding jobs to provide 
for the family.64 In the meantime, other than a few sporadic 
jobs, the wife had allocated her efforts toward managing the 
home and caring for the children, thereby foregoing 
employment training, experience, income and benefits.65 The 
trial court in this case on similar facts did not make a 
similar mistake. 
A review of the relevant facts in this case reveals a 
strong resemblance to Higley and further indicates that the 
trial court's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato in this case is 
61
 H i g l e y , 676 P . 2 d a t 382 . 
62
 I d . a t 3 8 0 - 3 8 1 . 
63
 I d . a t 3 8 1 . 
64
 J c L a t 3 8 0 - 3 8 1 . 
65
 I d . a t 3 8 1 . 
25 
correct. Ms. Lovato is forty-seven years old and has only 
limited education and work experience operating an 
occasional craft booth business and housecleaning.66 As a 
result of Ms. Lovato's efforts managing the home and caring 
for their children, Mr. Lovato has also been able to build 
his career and work at two jobs.67 The trial court found 
specifically that Mr. Lovato would not have the marital home 
or other property he has today had it not been for Ms. 
Lovato's efforts throughout their marriage. "As a matter of 
public policy, the Court expects the Respondent's monthly 
alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's 
to be met, because without the Respondent's efforts during 
the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other 
property he enjoys today."68 In view of the facts in this 
case and their remarkable similarity to the facts in Higley, 
it would have been a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion to award a lower alimony payment to Ms. Lovato. 
66
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 11. See also copy of Amended 
Divorce Decree at page 13. 
67
 Id. at 11. See also copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 12-
13. 
68
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 13 . 
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Offset: 
Mr. Lovato7s argument regarding the alimony being an 
offset for child support is fatally flawed in several 
respects. First, Mr. Lovato is wrong on the facts. The 
trial court specifically found that Mr. Lovato has the 
ability to both increase his income and reduce his 
expenses.69 Mr. Lovato has opted to forego increasing his 
income and reducing his expenses and has instead opted to 
pursue ongoing 
litigation.70 
Furthermore, the trial court explicitly rejected Mr. 
Lovato's unfair characterization of its ruling as merely 
being an alimony award offset by child support.71 The trial 
court's award of alimony to Ms. Lovato should be sustained 
because the facts and circumstances of this case amply 
support the award.72 
Second, Mr. Lovato is wrong on the law. Alimony, child 
69
 Id. at pages 12-13, para 44. 
70
 See "Course of Proceedings" and "Summary of Relevant Facts" 
Sections of this Brief. 
71
 See Judge Nehring's Minute Entry dated March 23, 2000. 
72
 See copy of Divorce Decree at pages 10-13. See also copy of 
Amended Divorce Decree at pages 9-14. 
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support and other monetary amounts awarded in divorce 
actions are often offset against each other,73 In Utah Dept. 
of Social Services v. Adams, this Court held that the ex-
husband's $200 per month child support obligation could be 
set-off in exchange for allowing his ex-wife and children to 
live rent-free in a home he owned which had a fair market 
rental value of $350 per month.74 Furthermore, this Court 
termed the position of the Utah Department of Social 
Services that such a set-off was not possible as a 
"curiosity" and an "economic absurdity."75 As another 
example, in Coulon v. Coulon, the husband's equity in the 
marital home in that case was reduced by the trial court 
after being offset against his child support arrearage 
existing at that time.76 This Court affirmed this result.77 
Mr. Lovato's position is a curiosity considering Utah law. 
In part, this practice was affirmed in Coulon because it 
73
 See Claudia Catalano, Annotation, Spouse's Right To Set Off Debt 
Owed By Other Spouse Against Accrued Spousal Or Child Support 
Payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (1993). (Right depends on particular 
circumstances involved.) 
74
 Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 




 Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
77
 Coulon, 915 P.2d at 1072. 
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is consistent with sound public policy. In Coulon, this 
Court recognized that "[T]his result is consistent with the 
policy prohibiting a plaintiff from delaying an action until 
after a defendant's counterclaim is barred by the statute of 
limitations."78 Application of this policy makes particular 
sense in this case where Mr. Lovato has filed for 
bankruptcy, has consistently proven his unwillingness to pay 
the alimony he lawfully owes to Ms. Lovato79 and where he has 
even implied a similar intention in the future.80 The trial 
court's application of sound public policy to the specific 
facts in this case should similarly be affirmed. 
Equalizing Standards of Living: 
Mr. Lovato's argument that the trial court did not equalize 
the standards of living of the parties should similarly be 
78
 Id. See also North Am. Land Corp. v. Boutte, 604 S.W.2d 245, 247 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1980). 
79
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 12, para 3 9 where Mr. Lovato's 
refusal to pay alimony to Ms. Lovato affected her visitation with 
the children. See also "Course of Proceedings" and "Summary of 
Relevant Facts" Sections of this Brief. 
80
 See Appellant's Brief at page 26. ("If, for any reason, Mr. 
Lovato is unable to pay alimony . . .") Ms. Lovato under Coulon 
could have lawfully sued to reduce Mr. Lovato's equity in the 
marital home because of Mr. Lovato's persistent refusals to pay the 
alimony he owed Ms. Lovato. Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072-
1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Cf. Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025, 
1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Wife was even entitled to statutory 
interest on temporary alimony arrearages under §15-1-4.) 
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rejected because it lacks merit. The issue of determining 
standard of living in alimony cases is "fact-sensitive" and 
because the court must consider "all relevant facts and 
equitable principles/7 we defer to the court's sound 
discretion in determining the parties' standard of living."81 
The trial court attempted to equalize the standards of 
living of the parties as nearly as possible. "Therefore, it 
is reasonable for (Mr. Lovato) to pay in alimony at least 
$900 per month which will allow (Ms. Lovato) to live in a 
reasonably comparable standard of living as does (Mr. 
Lovato)."82 Furthermore, Mr. Lovato's efforts to "equalize" 
the parties' standards of living present a factual dispute 
and Mr. Lovato's calculations are unfair to Ms. Lovato.83 In 
conclusion, all of Mr. Lovato's arguments with respect to 
the trial court's award of alimony should be rejected. 
81
 Hoaaland v. Hoaqland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(discussing issues of timing of determination)(quoting Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991)). 
82
 Divorce Decree at page 12, para 39 and 40 (alteration added). See 
also Amended Divorce Decree at page 13, para 49. 
83
 See Appellant's Brief at page 15. (Mr. Lovato decides that 
"storage is unnecessary with an apartment" as he recalculates Ms. 
Lovato's living expenses.) Refer also to Mr. Lovato's disagreement 
with economies of scale discussed in the first subdivision of the 
"Argument" Section of this Brief. 
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Attorney's Fees: 
Mr. Lovato also unreasonably argues that the trial court 
should not have ordered him to pay both parties' attorney's 
fees. "We have previously held that Section §30-3-3 affords 
divorce litigants "a broader award of reimbursement, if need 
be, for the expenses of litigation, than those 
reimbursements authorized in other civil cases."84 The trial 
court exercised its sound discretion in ordering Mr. Lovato 
to pay both parties' attorney's fees and based its order on 
clearly sufficient evidence. 
It has been necessary for the Respondent to secure the 
services of an attorney to represent her in this action 
which has been made unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming 
because of Petitioner's domestic violence against 
Respondent, his financial and visitation demands on 
Respondent, and his unwillingness to make reasonable efforts 
toward settlement. Petitioner is in the better position to 
pay Respondent's attorney's fees and he should be required 
84
 Rappleye v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (in 
this case the Court held that this section is even applicable to 
accounting costs) (quoting Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . 
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to pay the Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of at 
least $8995.85 
Since the trial court both exercised its sound 
discretion and based its award on clearly sufficient 
evidence, the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato should 
be affirmed. 
Contrary to Mr. Lovato's assertions, the trial court 
would have abused its discretion had it not awarded 
attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato in this case. In Haumont v. 
Haumont, this Court further stated, "The court abuses its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney's 
fees] requested unless the reduction is warranted."86 Since 
Mr. Lovato's appeal is frivolous and has been filed in bad 
faith, the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato is also 
warranted under both Utah statutory law and the rules of 
this Court.87 In Rappleye, this Court ruled that the trial 
85
 Divorce Decree at page 14, para 51. See also Appellant's Brief at 
page 29. 
86
 Rappleye, 855 P.2d 265-266 (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
87
 Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (applicable if action without merit and 
if filed in bad faith) and Utah R. App. P. 33 (applicable to appeal 
brought from an action which is properly determined to be in bad 
faith and is necessarily frivolous). See also first subdivision of 
"Argument" Section of this brief discussing Mr. Lovato's bad faith 
in filing this appeal. 
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court had abused its discretion when it ordered a sua sponte 
reduction from the amount of attorney's fees requested by 
the wife in a divorce action absent any articulable reason 
for doing so.88 The trial court in this case clearly 
considered the factors in Rappleye for determining 
attorney's fees.89 Therefore, the award of attorney's fees 
should be affirmed. 
Close consideration of the factors in Rappleye also 
reveal that not awarding attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato would 
have been an abuse of discretion in this case. The trial 
court considered the difficulty of this litigation, which 
has been made "unnecessarily lengthy and time consuming" by 
reason of the actions of Mr. Lovato. As a result of Mr. 
Lovato's prolongation of this litigation, Mr. Lovato has 
incorrectly characterized his court-ordered payment of 
attorney's fees as a "living expense."90 Furthermore, 
although Mr. Lovato disputes paying Ms. Lovato's attorney's 
fees, Mr. Lovato apparently is able to maintain payments to 
88




 See Appellant's Brief at pages 15 and 18. 
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his own attorneys for this appeal.91 However, another result 
of Mr. Lovato's prolongation of this litigation has been 
that Ms. Lovato's attorneys have now been required to expend 
copious hours on this case. Nevertheless, the factors 
favoring the award of attorney's fees to Ms. Lovato do not 
end here. 
Additional factors also favor the award of attorney's 
fees to Ms. Lovato. Ms. Lovato's attorney practices and is 
experienced in the area of domestic relations. She is 
familiar with the rates charged in this locality for similar 
services and her fees are comparatively reasonable in light 
of her expertise. This Court affirmed another award of 
attorney's fees on similar grounds in Osguthorpe v. 
Osguthorpe.92 It is only fair under these circumstances to 
require Mr. Lovato to pay Ms. Lovato's attorney's fees. 
Ms. Lovato is also entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal. "Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded 
below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will 
91
 See Appellant's Brief at page 15 n.57 and page 23 n.76. 
92
 Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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also be awarded to that party on appeal."93 This Court found 
that Ms. Rappleye substantially prevailed on the issues on 
appeal and remanded to the trial court to consider the 
attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Rappleye on appeal.94 Since 
remand is unnecessary in this case, this Court should award 
Ms. Lovato attorney's fees incurred as a result of this 
appeal. 
Trial Court's Judgement That Equity Of The Marital Residence 
Should Bear An Interest Rate 
This Court should affirm the trial court's judgement that 
Ms. Lovato's equity in the marital residence should bear an 
interest rate. The rule in Utah is that this determination 
is within the discretion of the trial court.95 In Crofts, 
Argyle and Osguthorpe, the determinations of the trial 
courts that interest should not be awarded were affirmed in 
all of these instances.96 The trial court's judgement in 
93
 Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 266 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Accord Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
94
 Id. at 267. 
95
 David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Divorce & Separation: Award of 
Interest On Deferred Installment Payments Of Marital Asset 
Distribution, 10 A.L.R.5th 191 (2001) (citing Crofts v. Crofts, 21 
Utah 2d 332, 334, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1968), Argyle v. Argyle, 
688 P.2d 468, 472 (Utah 1984)). 
96
 See Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 754 (Utah 1978) (A higher rate of 
interest than provided for a late payment of cash ordered paid in a 
35 
this case should also be affirmed. 
The trial court's judgement makes particular sense 
considering the facts in this case. The trial court 
recognized that the present value of the payment of the 
balance lawfully owed Ms. Lovato, if deferred, would 
diminish over time. The trial court initially attempted to 
avoid such an inequitable result by offering Mr. Lovato the 
opportunity to refinance the marital residence, or through 
some other manner, to satisfy Ms. Lovato7s judgement within 
thirty days from trial.97 If Mr. Lovato was unable to 
satisfy Ms. Lovato's judgement within this time period, the 
marital residence was immediately to be sold.98 Recognizing 
also that this would represent a hardship for the children, 
the trial court modified its order in the Amended Divorce 
Decree.99 However, Ms. Lovato at that time under Coulon 
could have also lawfully sued to reduce Mr. Lovato's equity 
property division in a divorce action will be affirmed where the 
property division is reasonable and equitable.) See also Stroud v. 
Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 758 P.2d 905 
(Utah 1988) (A judgement for child support arrearages should bear 
the statutory rate of interest until paid in full. Furthermore, the 
trial court may raise this interest rate if equity so requires under 
§30-3-5. ) 
97
 See copy of Divorce Decree at page 9, para 31. 
98
 Id. at para 32. 
99
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at pages 6-9. 
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in the marital home because of Mr. Lovato's persistent 
refusals to pay the alimony he owed Ms. Lovato.100 The trial 
court instead allowed Mr. Lovato to pay more gradually and 
also opted to conserve scarce judicial resources. The trial 
court's award of interest at the post-judgement rate (then 
6.513% per annum) represented the fairest result for all the 
parties involved.101 Therefore, this result should be 
affirmed. 
The result reached by the trial court not only comports 
most closely with the best interests of all the parties 
concerned in this case, but is also clearly supported by the 
law in Utah and other jurisdictions. In Adelman v. Adelman, 
the husband was held to be entitled to interest on his fixed 
equity in the martial home.102 His interest originated from 
the date of the order first establishing his equity 
100
 Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P. 2d 1069, 1072-1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Cf. Hoaaland v. Hoaaland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(Wife was entitled to statutory interest on temporary alimony 
arrearages under §15-1-4.) See also Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 
1155, 1158 (Utah 1983) ("Installments of support payments ordered in 
a divorce decree become vested in the recipient when they become 
due." citing Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706, 708 (Utah 1977) and 
Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977)). 
101
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 8, para 32. 
102
 Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P. 2d 741, 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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therein.103 Mr. Lovato now maintains the very same claim in 
this case that the wife maintained and that this Court 
rejected in that case.104 This Court also acknowledged in 
Adelman that the husband's equity could be reduced by the 
amount of his alimony arrearage in addition to any accrued 
interest.105 Thus, the result reached by the trial court in 
this case is consistent with Utah law. 
The result reached by the trial court in this case is 
also in accord with the law of other jurisdictions. One 
husband was required to either sell certain corporate stock 
or to pay the wife her share in periodic installments with 
interest over twenty years.106 In another case, an early pay-
off provision was held to be a proper incentive for a 
husband who had a history of failing to comply with court 
orders.107 However, it was an abuse of discretion to award 
the wife lower interest than the statutory rate on property 




 IdL a t 745. 
105
 IcL a t 746. 
106
 In Re Marriage of Harding, 533 P.2d 947, 950 (Colo. App. 1977). 
107
 In Re Marriage of Stenshoel, 866 P.2d 635, 642 (Wash. App. 1993). 
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adequate reason.108 Another reviewing court decided that it 
was within the discretion of the trial court to order the 
payment of interest where the husband contended that the 
payment of this interest would be an undue burden on him and 
that he would be unable to support himself if he was 
required to pay it.109 The trial court in this case 
specifically ordered Mr. Lovato to execute a special 
warranty deed110 and the payment of interest according to the 
provisions of warranty deeds is recognized under Utah law.111 
Thus, the specific facts of this case, Utah law, the law of 
surrounding jurisdictions and sound public policy support 
the judgement of the trial court. 
Fire Insurance Proceeds: 
The trial court's ruling with respect to paying Ms. Lovato 
her fair share of fire insurance proceeds should also be 




 In Re Marriage of Wessel, 715 P.2d 45, 49 (Mont. 1986). See also 
Cotton v. Cotton, 439 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. App. D2 1983), review 
denied, 447 So.2d 886 (Fla.)(where an alimony award was divided into 
thirty-nine equal quarterly payments with interest compounding at 
the statutory rate or option to pay entire amount with interest 
accruing until paid.) 
110
 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 9, para 35. 
111
 Powell v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1975) . 
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equitable divisions of property encompasses all assets 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived, including insurance.112 The trial 
court correctly concluded that insurance proceeds are a 
marital asset.113 Mr. Lovato collected $17,404.58 from an 
insurance company after a fire occurred in the marital 
residence in 1998.114 He later testified at trial that he 
used most of the insurance proceeds for his own personal 
living expenses.115 Ms. Lovato was no longer living in the 
marital home.116 Mr. Lovato is the wrongdoer in this 
situation.117 Both the facts and the law support the trial 
court's ruling with respect to the award of one-half of the 
fire insurance proceeds to Ms. Lovato. Therefore, the award 
should be left undisturbed. 
112
 Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd. , 949 P.2d 779, 783 n.7 
(quoting DOQU V. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982) and Englert 
v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978)). See also Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-433 (Utah 1982). 
113




 See copy of Amended Divorce Decree at page 7, para 27. 
116
 Id. at para 2 8. 
117
 See Appellant's Brief at page 33 where Mr. Lovato discusses 
collateral source rule and reasons that Ms. Lovato is the wrongdoer. 
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CONCLUSION: 
For the reasons stated herein, Ms. Lovato respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the trial court on all of the 
foregoing issues. Furthermore, Ms. Lovato also requests 
this Court to estop Mr. Lovato from further abusing her and 
the judicial system through his groundless prolongation of 
this litigation. Since this appeal also lacks merit, Ms. 
Lovato also asks that this Court award her' attorney's fees 
for the costs of this appeal. Considering the facts and 
circumstances of this case, Ms. Lovato also prays for any 
other relief that this Court deems necessary and proper. 
DATED, this /) day of June, 2001. 
KELLEY & KELLEY, LLC 
10NICA Z. "KELLI 
Attorney for Re(g£>ondent/Appellee 
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have been signed, then Petitioner Moves the Court pursuant to URCP 59 and other applicable Rules, 
for an order correcting the Findings, Conclusions and Decree in the manner and for the reasons 
stated below. Without attempting to re-state each suggested change, Petitioner also renews his 
OCT 2 5.1999 
/ yJU^r 
—&* D^P"~~ 





[-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
request that the changes suggested in his 9/27/99 "Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law," the content of which is incorporated herein by reference. 
n 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
H. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
EI. OBJECTIONS TO "AMENDED" DECREE (Judgment is not an "Amended" Decree) . . . . 3 
1. Amended decree 3 
IV. OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS & DECREE ; 3 
A. OBJECTIONS TO ALIMONY 3 
2. Petitioner lacks ability to pay alimony - Reducing transportation expense 4 
(a) Petitioner's automobile expenses 4 
(b) Respondent's automobile expense 5 
(c) Petitioner's expenses 5 
(1) Food & household supplies 5 
(2) Petitioner's "odier expenses." 6 
(3) Respondent's "other expenses." 6 
(4) Respondent's expenses are overstated 7 
(d) Attorney fees 7 
(e) Error in Court's computation 8 
(1) Corrected child support 8 
(2) Petitioner's corrected income 9 
(3) Federal income tax deductions 9 
(4) FICA payroll deductions 9 
(5) Utah income tax payments 10 
(6) Petitioner's net available funds , -. -> 10 
(7) Petitioner's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney fees 10 
(f) Imputed income 11 
(g) Paying alimony instead of court ordered payments to bankruptcy trustee 11 
(h) Respondent's work history 12 
(i) Equalizing standard of living 12 
(j) Funds available to parties 13 
(k) Alimony should be paid to Petitioner 14 
B. ATTORNEYFEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 15 
3. Petitioner lacks ability- to pay attorney fees 15 
C. RESPONDENT'S'EQUITY SHOULD NOT BEAR INTEREST 16 
4. Interest should not accrue on Respondent's lien under Utah Law 16 
5. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equity 17 
2-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
D. WINDFALL RE INSURANCE PROCEEDS 18 
6. Insurance proceeds was not a marital asset 18 
E. WINDFALL RE COLLATERAL SOURCE REPAIRS 19 
7. Collateral source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for fire damage repairs to 
Respondent 19 
F. FUTURE ATTORNEY FEES 20 
8. Provision re future attorney fees violates Utah Law 20 
V. CONCLUSION 21 
VI. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21 
in 
OBJECTIONS TO "AMENDED" DECREE 
Judgment is not an "Amended Decree" 
1. Amended decree. The document is improperly labeled as an "Amended Decree," whereas 
it is merely a supplement order which disposes of issues reserved when the 5/4/98 divorce decree 
was entered. The divorce itself is final and was not changed by the supplemental trial to resolve the 
reserved issues. The term "Amended Decree" implies that the prior divorce decree may have not 
been a final judgment. A more appropriate title for the document would be "Order re Reserved 
Issues," or some such more descriptive title. 
IY 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS & DECREE 
A 
OBJECTIONS TO ALIMONY 
Petitioner objects to various provisions of the proposed Findings, Conclusions and Decree. By 
reason of the nature of many of the objections, no attempt has been made to propose revised 
wording. 
3-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
2. Petitioner lacks ability to pay alimony. The Court's Finding [^53 and Decree % 44, and 
other related provisions, incorrectly find: (i) that Petitioner's standard of living is higher than 
Respondents,' (ii) that she has a need for alimony to obtain suitable housing to meet her parenting 
responsibilities, and (iii) that Petitioner has the ability to pay alimony by reducing his living 
expenses, and by working a second job. Those findings are in error for various reasons, including 
the following: 
Reducing transportation expense 
(a) Petitioner's automobile expenses. The Court erroneously concluded that 
Petitioner's S2751 per month automobile expense could be reduced, and the saving applied toward 
alimony. Petitioner drives a minimum of 650 miles to work each month,2 and estimates that he 
drives a minimum of 200 per month transporting the children to activities, driving to the grocery 
store, church, and for other family purposes, for a total of not less than about 850 miles per month. 
IRS (very conservative) regulations3 fix the per mile cost of driving an automobile at 32.5^ per mile. 
Using that rate per mile, Petitioner's monthly cost is S276,4 which is slightly higher than the S275 
listed by Petitioner as his monthly automobile expense. As a practical matter, Petitioner's vehicles 
are old, repair and maintenance costs are much higher than if he had a newer vehicle, and they must 
be replaced within a reasonable time, and the $275 includes insurance on his vehicles. Petitioner's 
1
 The S275 per month automobile expense includes automobile insurance of about S83 per month, which 
leaves only SI92 for gasoline, maintenance, repair and depreciation (or replacement cost). 
2
 30 miles round trip each day X 5 = 150 miles per week X 4 1/3 weeks per month = 650 miles per month. 
3
 Rev. Proc. 97-58. See 1999 U.S. Master Tax Guide § 945, page 275. 
4
 800 miles X 32.5? =S260. 
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vehicle payments of approximately S560 per month5 are being paid through his bankruptcy, and are 
not included as part of his automobile expense. It is not realistic to conclude that Petitioner, with 
his need to drive to work and to meet the minor childrens' transportation needs, could reasonably 
reduce his automobile expense to free up money to pay alimony, and to impose an alimony upon him 
based upon such a speculation. Petitioner objects to the Court's conclusion that Petitioner can 
reduce his automobile expense, and thereby create the ability to pay alimony. 
(b) Respondent's automobile expense. Respondent lists her automobile expense as 
$421 per month. After deducting her S251 payment, and S60 insurance, her net operating cost is 
SI 10 for one person, as compared with Petitioner's comparable monthly cost ofS192 for himself and 
two children. Petitioner's operating costs are also increased because he drives a large van to 
accommodate the needs of the children, while Respondent drives a smaller vehicle.6 
Reducing "other expenses" 
(c) Petitioner's expenses. Petitioner's other expenses are at a poverty level, and cannot 
reasonably be further reduced, as suggested by the Court, to make money available for alimony. The 
children should not be deprived of necessities to improve Respondent's lifestyle. For example: 
(1) Food & household supplies. Petitioner's food and household supply cost is S400 
per month for three persons, or S133 per month, S4.38 per day, and S1.46 per meal, per person. The 
actual amount available for food is less than this amount, since the S400 also includes household 
Petitioner estimates that his vehicle payments were about S560 per month, however they have not been 
included as automobile expense because they are being paid through his bankruptcy and they are part of his monthly 
payment to the bankruptcy trustee. 
6
 Respondent drives a compact (small) automobile, which is believed to be a 1998 Mercury Tracer. 
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supplies. Petitioner's cost is S250 per month for one person, or about S8.22 per day, and $2.74 per 
meal. Respondent is allowed SI .28 more per meal than Petitioner and the children combined. If an 
expense is to be reduced to allow Respondent to acquire more suitable housing, it cannot be by 
further reducing food and household supplies for the children, but rather, should be acquired by 
reducing Respondent's allowance for those items. Petitioner objects to the Court's conclusion that 
his food should be reduced to find funds to pay alimony to Respondent. 
(2) Petitioner's "other expenses." Petitioner's "other expanses" are at abare-bones 
level. He lists only minimal amounts for three persons, while the same amount for only one person 
on Respondent's list are much higher. Petitioner lists S130 for entertainment and incidentals, or $43 
per person, while Respondent lists S300 for the same items. Funds to pay alimony cannot 
realistically be obtained by further reducing the children's living costs. Petitioner objects to the 
Court's finding and conclusion that funds are available from that source to pay alimony. 
(3) Respondent's "other expenses." On the other hand, Respondent's expenses can 
be readily adjusted to provide funds to rent an apartment. For example, if she has an apartment 
where she can visit with and entertain the children, the following items marked with "*" could 
readily be applied to rent. Respondent should not have a higher standard of living than Petitioner. 
Items marked with "~" have been adjusted to the same per-person amount as has been allowed to 
Respondent and the children. If reductions in Petitioner's living standards are to be made to assist 
Respondent in obtaining an apartment, those reductions should apply equally to the Respondent -
Petitioner and the children on the one hand, and Respondent on the other hand. If those adjustments 
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are made, Respondent will have about S651 per month available to pay rent, or for other purposes, 
as demonstrated below: 
Rent (now being paid) $ 200* 
Entertainment (now $200-adj. to $33) 167*-
Incidentals (now $ 100 - adj. To $ 10) 90*~ 
Storage (unnecessary w/apt.) 57* 
Clothing (Now $30-adj. to S10) 20-
Food (S250-adj. to $133) 117-
Total reduction in expenses $ 651 
Overstatement of Respondent's expenses 
(4) Respondent's expenses are overstated. Respondent's monthly living expenses 
are overstated by $131.44. Respondent lists child support payments as $317.16, and children's 
medical as S75.59, for a total of S392.75. However, under the prior order Respondent has only paid 
S261.31 per month, which results in a S131.44 overstatement of her monthly living expenses. 
Without considering the S651 overstatement discussed in the preceding paragraph, at a minimum 
to correct said S131.44 error, the SI,825.75 total expenses listed in f^ 48 of the Findings, and in f^ 39 
of the Decree, should be corrected to $1,694.31. 
Payment on attorney fees 
(d) Attorney fees. In f 67 and 68 of the Findings, and % 57, 59 and 60 of the Decree, 
the Court concludes that Petitioner must pay attorney fees of not less than $19,8117 - an 
overwhelming task. If he were able to pay even $ 100 per month to each attorney, for a total of $200 
7
 Not less than $8,040 fees incurred by Petitioner and SI 1, 771 incurred by Respondent, a total of S 19,811. 
Actual fees owed by Petitioner to his attorney are now several thousand dollars higher as a result of post-trial work. 
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per month,8 and if no interest were charged, it would take about 99 months or 4 Vi years to pay the 
attorney fees. If Petitioner is unable to work out satisfactory arrangements for payment of attorney 
fees, he will probably be required to somehow include those payments in his pending bankruptcy, 
which will substantially increase the monthly payment to the bankruptcy trustee, and further reduce 
his ability to pay alimony. As a practical matter, ordering Petitioner to pay Respondent's attorney 
fees will make payment of alimony virtually impossible. Petitioner objects to the Court's Finding 
Tf 68 and Decree \ 60, that "Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney 
fees," is not supported by the evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and because, as a practical matter, 
Petitioner simply lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney fees. See also discussion following 
the chart in \ 2(j) below. 
Available funds 
(e) Error in Court's computation. In % 50 of the Findings, and ^ 41 of the Decree, it 
appears the Court's computations may be in error. Ex. 2 shows Petitioner's bi-weekly pay as 
SI, 434.02, not 51,484.90. If we reduce that amount by the 530 tool allowance, the net bi-weekly 
amount is S1,404.02. If we multiply that by the 26 pay periods per year, Petitioner's annual income 
is 536,504.52 - 12 months = 53,042.04, rather than the 53,253 computed by the Court, as stated in 
Tf 41 of the Decree - an overstatement in Petitioner's income of 5210.96 per month. 
(1) Corrected child support. The corrected child support to be paid by Respondent, 
based upon the corrected amount per the child support worksheet, is S322.66, for a total payment, 
including medical, is 5439.33. 
8
 It appears that realistically Petmoner may be able to pay a total of only SI 00 per month on fees, which 
would take about 8 1/4 years. 
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(2) Petitioner's corrected income. Correcting Petitioner's income results in 
changing f 43 of the Decree, to a net income of $2,467.85, with the child support and medical 
reimbursement being changed to $439.33, and the total net monthly income changing to $2,907.18. 
(3) Federal income tax deductions. The court has deducted nothing from 
Petitioner's income for payroll taxes, based upon the assumption that he will owe no taxes. 
Petitioner objects to the Court using the temporary tax status as a basis for fixing long-term alimony, 
since his income tax liability will change as circumstances change. Further, since ^ f 56 of the Decree 
requires Petitioner to pay to Respondent an amount equal to one-half of the income tax benefit from 
claiming the children, his income tax liability is understated by claiming the children as dependents, 
even though he must pay one-half of the tax benefit to Respondent. Respondent cannot have it both 
ways. Petitioner should either receive credit for the federal S132.139 per month withholding tax 
deducted from his income to arrive at his net available funds, or he should not be ordered to pay 
Respondent one-half of the income tax benefit from claiming the children as deductions. The 
Court's order as written double-counts the federal income tax benefits, and the Findings and Decree 
should be corrected. 
(4) FICA payroll tax deductions. The Court's decision incorrectly fails to deduct 
FICA taxes of S194.5710 paid by Petitioner. That $194.57 should be deducted from Petitioner's 
income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony. 
9
 Ex. 2 shows that S60.98 is deducted from Petitioner's bi-weekly check - X 26 weeks in a year = 
S 1,585.48 per year- 12 months = S132.13 per month. 
10
 Ex. 2 shows that FICA taxes of S89.80 [S17.02 & S72.78] were deducted from his bi-weekly check, X 
26 pay periods = 52,334.80 per year - 12 months = 194.57 per month. 
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(5) Utah income tax payments. Ex. 6 shows that Petitioner's 1998 Utah State 
income tax was S275, or about S22.92 per month. Ex. 2 shows that Utah withholding tax was 
S87.4911 per month. Whichever amount the Court decides to use, that amount should be deducted 
from Petitioner's income to arrive at his net available funds for purposes of determining his ability 
to pay alimony. 
(6) Petitioner's net available funds. In ^ 52 of the Findings, and in Tf 43 of the 
Decree, the Court incorrectly determined that Petitioner has $3,043 available funds from which to 
pay monthly expenses. The amount of Petitioner's available funds stated in f 43 of the Decree 
should be changed from 53,043 to $2,492.93, computed as follows: 
Corrected monthly income ft[ 2(e) above] $3,042.04 
Add: corrected child support ffl 2(e)(1)] 439.33 
Total available funds before deductions 3,481.37 
Deductions: 
Deduction per Court ft 43 & 43 of Decree] 574.19 
Federal income tax withheld ft 2(e)(3)] 132.19 
FICA taxes ft 2(e)(4)] 194.57 
Utah income taxes ft 2(e)(5)] 87.4912 
Corrected deductions 988.^4 
Corrected net available funds '$2.492.93 
(7) Petitioner's monthly expenses increase to cover attorney fees. The Court 
should modify the Findings and Decree, including Tf 42 of the Findings, and ^ f 43 of Decree, to state 
that, in addition to the $3,043 of monthly expenses listed therein, Petitioner will be required to pay 
11
 Bi-weekly Utah withholding tax is S40.38 [Ex. 2] X 26 pay periods per year = 51,049.88 per year + 12 
months = S87.49 per month. 
12
 If we use Respondent's 1998 income taxes of Utah S275 [Ex. 6], then Petitioner's Utah income tax 
would be $22.29 per month and the corrected net available funds would be 52,558.13. 
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additional amounts of attorney fees, or an increased amount to the bankruptcy trustee, if he is unable 
to work out a reasonable payment arrangement with the two attorneys, and is required to include 
those obligations in his bankruptcy. 
(f) Imputed income. In ^  53 of the Findings, and 44 of the Decree, the Court concludes 
there is insufficient evidence to impute additional income to Petitioner, but then attempts to justify 
the award of alimony by actually imputing income to him by its finding that Respondent should be 
able to generate income from a second job from which to pay alimony. Gounsel for Petitioner has 
been unable to locate any authority for the proposition that a husband should be ordered to take a 
second job to pay alimony to his wife, particularly where, as here, his income is insufficient to meet 
the basic needs of the children of the parties and his self, and there are no facts to support imputed 
income. Further, Petitioner's ability to hold a second job is severely restricted by his need to care 
for the two children, and due to health problems and financial stress. Alimony attempts to equalize 
the ability of the parties to go forward with their lives.13 The Court has addressed only Respondent's 
alleged needs, yet not the ability of each party to go forward with their lives. See discussion and 
computation in ^ 2(j) below. 
(g) Paying alimony instead of court-ordered payments to bankruptcy trustee. The 
Court erred in its determination in ^ f 54 of the Findings, and ^  46 of the Decree, that Petitioner should 
pay alimony instead of making payments to the bankruptcy trustee. Ability to pay is a major factor 
in determining whether alimony should be awarded.14 If Petitioner fails to make his payment to the 
Howell v. Howell, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1991) 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) 
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bankruptcy trustee, his bankruptcy will be dismissed, the home and vehicle mortgages will be 
foreclosed, his wages will be garnished, and he will be unable to support the children, or to pay 
alimony. The Court's finding that alimony should be paid by Petitioner, in view of his limited 
income, the cost of supporting the children, his bankruptcy, etc., is in error, and that error is 
compounded by the Court's finding that Petitioner should pay alimony instead of making court-
ordered payments to the bankruptcy trustee. This case is factually similar to that in Endrody J5 where 
health problems and child care responsibilities hampered the husband's ability to return to his former 
occupation. 
(h) Respondent's work history. Petitioner objects to the language in ^ 47 and 48, to 
the effect that he has the ability to earn a much greater income, and that Respondent has allegedly 
not been employed, and that she has a limited earning capacity. To the contrary, Respondent has 
been heavily involved in craft, housecleaning, etc. business for many years, and has earned a 
substantial income. Respondent is in good health, has no dependents, and can work a second job 
without interfering with family responsibilities, unlike Petitioner if he worked a second job. 
Respondent's full-time job supplements her other business activities. The finding, as stated, is 
misleading and incorrect. 
(i) Equalizing standards of living. Petitioner objects to Finding ^ 57, and Decree^ 49, 
because they misstate the evidence and facts. If the parties' standards of living and income were to 
be equalized, it would be necessary for Respondent to pay alimony to Petitioner. See chart in ^ f 2(j) 
below, and discussion following that chart. 
15
 Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ap. 1996). 
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(j) Funds available to parties. The following summary demonstrates Petitioner's 
inability to pay and the inequality which will result from the Court's alimony order: 
Funds available to each partv is as follows: 
Gross income [% 44 & 39 of Decree] 
Child support & medical [worksheet] 
Alimony ft[ 49 of decree] 
Adjusted income [per decree] 
Corrections: 
Petitioner's income [«j 2(e) above]17 
FICA tax ft 2(e)(4) above] 
Utah withholding ft2(e)(5) above]18 
Correction of support [worksheet]19 
Fed. withholding tax ft 2(e)(3) above]20 
Total corrections 




































$4,899.14 52,623.92 S 2,275.22 
16 
17 
See«[ in Findings & ^ 38 of the Decree. 
This S210.96 reduction in Petitioner's monthly earnings, as shown in ^ 52 of the Findings and ^ 41 and 
43 of the Decree, where the Court concluded that 52,643.09 is Petitioner's monthly income, before adding S439.69 
of child support and medical payments to be paid by Respondent to Petitioner. See ^ 2(e) (above) where Petitioner 
asks the Court to correct that error. 
The corrected computation is as follows: S 1,434.02 per week - S30 tool allowance = S 1,404.02 X 26 pay 
periods per year = S36.504.52 - 12 month = S3,042.04 per month. This is S210.96 less than the S3,253 per month 
shown in * 52 of the Findings and ^41 of the Decree. 
18
 Utah withhold tax on bi-weekly earnings of SI,300.93 [Ex. 4] with three (3) exemptions is S62 x 26 pay 
periods in a year = S 1,612 per year - 12 = S 134.33 per month. This amount has been used in the foregemg 
computation. 
19
 The corrected child support worksheet shows a total obligation of S439.33 instead of S439.69 used by 
the Courting 52 of the Findings and*[43 of the decree, a decrease of 91^. 
20
 This is the monthly Federal withholding tax shown on Petitioner's pay stub, converted from bi-weekly 
to monthly. This amount is small because Petitioner claimed ten (10) exemptions [Ex. 2]. He will now only be 
entitled to three (3) exemptions, which will increase his the amount withheld from his paycheck. Petitioner's bi-
weekly Federal withholding tax will be S128 with three exemptions [Petitioner & 2 children] with a taxable income 
of SI,300.93 [Ex. 4] shown in ERS Circular E. If we convert that to a monthly basis, Peunoner's federal 
withholding tax will be S128 per month, which is the amount we have used above. 
As noted in ^ 2(e)(3) above, if Petitioner's income tax liability is reduced because he claims the children as 
exemptions and receives the earned income credit, and he is then required to pay to Respondent Vi of the income tax 
savings resulting from his claiming all of the children, he will then have a net income tax liability at least equal to lA 
of the amount he pays to Respondent. He should be allowed credit for income tax which he is paying through 
withholdmg. Respondent will, in effect, receive her share of any income tax refund from the tax savings which in \ 





Income after corrections (Trior page) 
Less: Debt Service 
$4,899.14 52,623.92 S2,275.22 
1.603.00 1.603 0021 - 0 -
Net funds available to each partv 3,296.14 1,020.92 2,275.2222 
Monthly living exp.[«143 & 39 of decree] 3.266.75 1.440 002! 1.826.7522 
Monthly surplus or (deficit) with alimonv S 29.39 (S 419 08) S 448.47* 
Monthly surplus or (deficit) w/o alimonv $ 29.39 (S 19.08) S 48 47 
(k) Alimony should be paid to Petitioner. If we add to Petitioner's debt service, 
a reasonable monthly payment toward his own attorney fees (over SI ljOOO),23 and the SI 1,771 the 
Court has ordered him to pay toward Respondent's attorney fees, the result will be to deprive the 
family of bare necessities. The children should not be required to suffer in order to permit 
Respondent to have a higher standard of living. If it is the Court's intent is to equalize the available 
funds between the parties, as it has ruled in ^ 53, 57, etc., of the Findings, and in Tf 44, 49, etc., of 
21
 Petitioner's debt service is as follows 
Country Wide Home Loans - Is1 mortgage 
Salt Lake City Credit Union - 2nd mortgage 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee 
Total monthly payments 
22






 In f 52 of the Findings & 43 of the Decree, the Court found Pentioner's Monthly Living Expenses to be 
S3,043 However, since SI,603 of debt service has been deducted above, Pentioner's Monthly Living Expenses has 
been reduced to S 1,440 [S3,043 - Sl,603 = S 1,440] 
22
 The Court has allowed Respondent SI,826 for living expenses for one person, and only $1,440 for three 
persons, or an average of S480 per person. This means that Respondent is being allowed S 1,346 per month more 
for living expenses than is being allowed to Petitioner and each of the children. As note in *l 2(c)(4) above, if 
Respondent were required to reduce her monthly living expenses to the same amount as is being allowed to each of 
the Petitioner and the two children, she would have an extra S651 available, which would more than sufficient to 
rent a suitable apartment. 
23
 In f^ 67 of the Findings and % 59 of the proposed decree, the Court has ordered Petitioner to pay his own 
attorney fees, which were then $8,040 Post-tnal services have increased that obligation to over $11,000. 
J r* J o r\ 
the decree, as proposed by Respondent, it would be necessary to order Respondent to pay alimony 
to Petitioner to assist him in meeting the crushing financial obligations required to support the two 
children and himself. This is clearly not a case where alimony or attorney fees should be awarded 
to Respondent.24 
B 
ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
3. Petitioner lacks ability to pay attorney fees. For the reasons discussed in ^ 2 above, 
specifically including f 2(j), it is clear that Petitioner lacks the ability to pay Respondent's attorney 
fees. Respondent is in a better financial situation to pay her attorney fees than is Petitioner. 
Although he is in bankruptcy, Petitioner must pay his own fees, which approximate the amount of 
Respondent's fees. To add S11,000 to that obligation makes it unrealistic to assume Petitioner could 
pay Respondent's fees. As demonstrated above, Petitioner simply has no funds with which to pay 
his own attorney fees, let alone Respondent' s attorney fees. On the other hand, Respondent is single, 
without dependents, and has (if in effect) been ordered to pay only a net of S39.69 toward supporting 
the children. She has the ability to resume her house cleaning business, or to increase her craft 
business income, by working a few extra hours each week. On the other hand, Petitioner's ability 
to work a second job is impaired because of his health problems, the time he needs to spend caring 
for the children, helping with school work, preparing meals, supervising their activities, and doing 
all of the things that a good parent needs to do for teenage children. The children need Petitioner 
24
 If the S400 per month alimony is disallowed, then Petitioner would have a monthly 
deficit of about S20 and Respondent would have a monthly surplus of about $50. However, the 
foregoing computations do not consider the fact that the Court has ordered Petitioner to also pay 
Respondent SI 1,771 in attorney fees. In addition to his own fees of $8,040, a total of over 
$19,811. Petitioner simply has no money with which to pay alimony or Respondent's attorney 
fees. 
even more because of the divorce. It is not appropriate to require Petitioner to be away from the 
children working a second job so Respondent can enjoy a better standard of living. On balance, if 
one party is ordered to pay the fees of the other party, it is Respondent who is in a better position to 
pay Petitioner's fees, than is Petitioner to pay Respondent's fees. Utah case law favors requiring 
each party to pay their own fees "where neither party reasonably has the ability to pay the other 
party's attorney fees."25 A very recent Utah Case includes an extensive^iscussion regarding the 
award of attorney fees.26 Each party should be ordered to pay their own attorney fees. 
C 
RESPONDENT'S EQUITY SHOULD NOT BEAR INTEREST 
4. Interest should not accrue on Respondent's lien, under Utah Law. Even though 
Respondent's complaint did not request interest on the home equity, in ^  41 of the Findings, and in 
f 32 of the proposed Decree, the Court awarded interest at the 6.513% statutory post-judgment rate 
on Respondent's SI5,399.70 hen on the family home. In Osguthorpe11 the Appellate Court affirmed 
denial of interest on divorce liens, and held as follows: 
According to Section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other than those rendered on 
a lawful contract, shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum.28 In addition, 
25
 Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App" 1990). The award of attorney fees must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness 
of the requested fees. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
26
 Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 976 P.2d 1, 1999 Utah App 109, 1999 WL 190502. 
27
 Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 536 (Utah App. 1990). 
2S
 Utah rate of interest on judgment as provided by UC 15-1-4 was reduced effective 5/3/93. See Brown 
v. David K. Richards & Co., 976 P.2d 1, 1999 Utah App 109, 1999 WL 190502. 
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the trial court in a divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest on a 
judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905,906 (Utah 1988). 
However, an equitable lien, unlike a judgment, only gives the lien-holder a right 
to collect the debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Bldg., N. V., 
663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgement on the other hand, is "the final 
consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it in an action or 
proceeding. (Emphasis added). 
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the Chris Lane home 
subject to a non-interest bearing equitable lien in favor of defendant for one-half of 
the present equity in the home. The court stated that the hen amount should be 
$22,500 and should be paid to defendant when plaintiff remarries, cohabits, sells the 
home, moves from the home, or when the youngest child reaches the age of majority, 
whichever occurs first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not been 
reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was awarded an equitable lien to which 
interest does not attach under section 15-1-4. We therefor affirm the trial court's 
award to defendant of a non-interest bearing equitable lien on the parties' property 
for S22?500. (Emphasis added). 
5. Award of interest makes the lien larger than the home equity. If for any reason interest 
could properly be awarded on a divorce created lien on marital property, it is an abuse of discretion 
to do so in this case, because with interest, Respondent is awarded SI,623 more than the foil equity 
in the home, computed as follows: 
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(1) Value of home (Findings K 34) 5130,000 
(2) Unpaid trust deeds on home: (Find. ^ 34) 
Countrywide Home Mtg. 5100,156 
Salt Lake Credit Union 9,398 
Total mortgage liens 109,554 
(3) Net eauitv 20,446 
(4) Lien awarded to Respondent 15.400 
(5) Petitioner's remaining equity 5 )^46 
(6) Interest on 515,400 @ 6.513 [Decree«[ 32] 
thru 6/24/0629 = 6.669 
(7) Petitioner's negative equity in home 5 1.623 
D 
WINDFALL RE INSURANCE PROCEEDS 
6. Insurance proceeds was not a marital asset. In ^ 41 of the Findings, and f 26 and 31 of 
the proposed Decree, the Court incorrectly held that 514,913.58 of insurance proceeds from a fire 
was a marital asset, and awarded Respondent S7,456.79, as one-half of that amount, and included 
it as part of Respondent's lien on the home. Prior to the fire, the parties owned a marital home which 
was worth S130,000. After the home was repaired by Petitioner and others who assisted him, it was 
still worth 5130,000. The court awarded one-half of that 5130,000 to Respondent. By also awarding 
her a lien for S7,456.79 (plus interest) as one-half of the unused insurance proceeds, Respondent has 
realized a 57,500 windfall. If Petitioner had done all of the work himself, which work was done after 
29
 Between 11/1/99 and 624/06 is 2,427 days. Simple interest on SI5,400 @ 6.513% per annum = $1,003 
per year - 365 = S2.748 per day X 2,427 days = S6,669.40. 
IB-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
the parties separated,30 surely it could not reasonably be argued that Respondent should be entitled 
to share in the value of his work. The Court found that upon separation the parties ended their 
economic partnership. From, and after, that date the home was, in effect, owned by Petitioner. 
Respondent is not entitled to a windfall by sharing insurance proceeds which were not part of the 
marital estate. The fact that others assisted him with the work and expense does not change the 
situation. 
E 
WINDFALL RE COLLATERAL SOURCE REPAIRS 
7. Collateral source doctrine precludes award of value of labor for fire damage repairs 
to Respondent. As discussed above, the fire damage repairs were made by Petitioner and others 
who assisted him. Respondent is not entitled to receive a windfall because Petitioner did not employ 
a contractor and pay him for the repairs, but instead obtained repairs from his "Collateral Source." 
That labor was from a "collateral source," generated solely by Petitioner, in which Respondent is 
not entitled to share. In Dubois31 at page 825 the Utah Supreme Court ruled: 
The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have 
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received 
or will receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent 
collateral source. (Emphasis added). 
The Court fixed the date of separation as the date for valuation of the marital estate. See ^ 3 of the 
Findings and ^ 2 of the proposed decree. 
31
 Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978). 
1^-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
In the 1997 Gibbs28 case, at page 345, the Utah Supreme Court quoted the foregoing language 
with approval. Applying Utah Law in 1994 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals FDIC29 case cited the 
Gibbs case with approval. The "Collateral Source" doctrine is still the Law in Utah. To award 
Respondent a share of fire insurance proceeds because the repairs were made from a "Collateral 
Source" is a clear violation of Utah Case Law. 
F 
FUTURE ATTORNEY FEES 
8. Provision re future attorney fees violates Utah Law. In f 71 of the Findings, and \ 63 of 
the proposed Decree, the Court orders the defaulting party to pay attorney fees which may be 
incurred in the future. Utah Law is clear that attorney fees may only be awarded where they are 
allowed pursuant to a contract or statute. No contract exists which authorizes the award of future 
attorney fees. UC § 30-3-3(1) authorizes the Court to award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. 
UC § 30-3-3(2) authorizes the Court to award attorney fees in an action to enforced an order in a 
domestic case, but gives the Court which hears that matter discretion to award or deny fees based 
upon its determination of such things as: (a) which party "substantially prevailed," (b) if a party is 
"impecunious," or (c) for other reasons entered into the record. The proposed future award would 
violate that statute, and may improperly deprive a future judge, who might hear such matters, of 
some or all of his statutory discretion. 
Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U. S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). 
FDIC v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 20 F. 3rd 1070, 1083 (10th Cir. Utah 1994). 
20-Petitioner's Obj to Proposed Findings & Decree 
IY 
CONCLUSION 
For various reasons, including those discussed above, the Court should change its ruling in this 
case to, among other things, (a) not award any alimony, (b) not award any attorney fees, (c) not 
award Respondent a share of fire insurance proceeds, (d) not award interest on Respondent's lien, 
(e) not order attorney fees as to future proceedings to enforce this decree^f) not refer to the order 
in this matter is an "Amended Decree of Divorce," (g) correct the amount of child support to be paid 
by Respondent, and (h) reserve an issue as to medical reimbursement owed by Respondent to 
Petitioner (bills approximating $1,284.92 have been submitted to Respondent by Petitioner which 
she has not paid or acknowledge her obligation to pay one-half of that amount, or S642.46). In the 
alternative, judgment should be entered in favor of Petitioner, and against Respondent, for that 
amount, or the Court should otherwise make an order concerning that amount. 
Dated October 26, 1999. 
Ronald C. Barker, attorney for Petitioner--" 
V 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *-£ day of October, 1999,1 caused a copy of the foregoing to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Monica Z. Kelley, KELLEY & KELLEY, 1000 Boston Building, 9 
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
v^^lC 
Ronald C. Barker 




MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563) 
KELLEY & KELLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
Fax: (801)531-6690 
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RE5Pe-VDE?rT5 PROPOSES " ^ ^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 974904424DA 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
Respondent. Petra Lovato. by and through her counsel of record, Monica Kelley, hereby 
submits her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the Court's consideration as this 
matter is set for bench trial on September 3, 1999. 
Marital History 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were married on May 26. 1984 and were married for 13 
years when they separated on or about August 16. 1997. 
2. At the recommendation of the Honorable Pat Brian and in furtherance of the 
convenience of the parties', the Coun bifurcated the divorce proceeding and the Order for Bifurcation 
and Decree of Divorce based on irreconcilable differences was entered on May 4.1998. At that time, 
the parties had been married almost 14 years. 
3. At the time the bifurcation was ordered no determination was made as to when the 
marital estate would be valued, and the parties would have been married more than 15 years in 
September 9, 1999. 
Child Custody, Visitation and Support: 
4. The parties have two minor children born as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian 
Lovato, age 13 born April 18, 1986, and Alexander Daniel Lovato. age 11 born June 24. 1988. 
5. There are no other proceedings regarding the children's custody pending in a court of 
this state or any other state. 
6. The parties should be awarded the joint legal custody of the minor children, with the 
primary physical custody awarded to the Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal 
right to visit with the minor children. 
7. Visitation should occur as the parties agree. If they are unable to agree, visitation 
should occur according to the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35 and the parties should 
incorporate the Advisory Guidelines for visitation found in UCA 30-3-33 in their visitation practices. 
8. Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a salary of S3.217 
per month gross income. In addition, he supplements his income through work at his auto body shop 
which he operates to earns an additional income of S 1.500 per month. 
9. Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Companj and earns S8.95 per hour, or S 1.551 
per month gross income* In addition, she supplements her income through her craft booth business 
and earns an additional income of S250 per month. 
11. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) it is reasonable and proper that 
the Respondent be ordered to pay Petitioner as child support S324.56 per month which calculates the 
parties child support obligation according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines and income from 
one full-time job. Respondent's child support obligation should continue until the youngest of the 
minor children becomes 18 years of age. or has graduated from high school during the child's normal 
and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation 
should be recalculated as provided for by law. and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of 
age. or has graduated from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation, 
whichever occurs later. Each of the parties should be under mutual obligation to notify the other 
within ten (10) days of any change in monthly income. 
10. Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time 
periods during which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written 
agreement of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day 
requirement. 
11. Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the fifth day 
of every month and one half by the twentieth day of e\ery month, or otherwise as the parties may 
agree. 
12. Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action and 
has no child support arrearage due to the Petitioner. 
13. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.15 (J 953 as amended). Petitioner shall maintain insurance 
for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner should provide verification 
of coverage to the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to 
the Respondent each year by January 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of any change of 
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or 
should have known of the change. 
14. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by 
a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be calculated by dividing 
the premium amount by the number of the parties' children. Presently, Petiuoner maintains the health 
insurance coverage for the minor children, but pays no out of pocket monthly premium expense. 
15. Bouh parties shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and copayments. incurred for the minor children and actually paid b\ 
the parties. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and 
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
16. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the 
above verification requirements. 
17. The children are of an age and maturity where they do not require the supervision of 
day care provider. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations: 
18. Throughout the parties marriage. Petitioner was the primary income earner and 
regularly worked more than one full time job to support the family financially. Respondent was a 
stay-at-home parent who worked odd jobs and maintained a small craft business to supplement the 
family income. 
19. At the time of separation, the parties owned the following joint debt: Countrywide 
Home mortgage for the marital residence, John Paras Furniture for household furniture. Granite 
Furniture for carpet in the marital home, RC Willey for a dining room set, and a van automobile loan. 
All debt should be awarded to Petitioner as his sole and exclusive obligation, and he should be ordered 
to hold Respondent harmless on these debts and obligations for the following re^on^ These debts are 
included with Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and are related to property to be awarded to the 
Petitioner under this divorce. Had the parties remained married, these debts would have been paid 
from Petitioner's income from his employment as he was the primary income earner. Finally. 
Respondent lacks the ability to pay these debts. 
20. Petitioner's obligation to pay these marital debts should be deemed his obligation in 
Ijpn nf flflfjirional sponsgl support and ^ *nrh shnnln* he nnn-riifjrharg**b1» in h«n lT"pTrV Any debt 
included in Petitioner's bankruptcy petition filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 98-
32926 should be Petitioner's sole and e\clusi\e obligation to pay, and he should hold Respondent 
harmless thereon. 
21. Petitioner should be ordered to assume and pay, and hold the Respondent harmless 
from liability on. all debts and obligations incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation in 
August 1997. and thereafter, all debts and obligations contracted by the parties should be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred the particular debt. 
22. Respondent should be ordered to assume and pay, and hold Petitioner harmless from 
s 
liability on, any and all debts and obligations incurred by her since August 1997. 
Provisions Relating to Personal Property: 
23. During the marriage, the panies acquired certain items of personal property. Said 
personal property should be awarded to the panies as follows. 
24. To Petitioner: 
Most household appliances, electronics, shop tools, furniture, pictures, old living room 
set with all its tables, boy's bedroom furniture. 1994 GMC Van. 1965 Pomiac. 1988 
Dodge Caravan and other personal property identified on Petitioner's bankruptcy 
petition valued at SI2.290. 
25. To Respondent.-
BEDROOM AND MISCELLANEOUS 
Chest from bedroom 
Mrs. Thomas's little couch 
Swag from bedroom 
Picture from bathroom and wreath 
Dryer 
LIVING ROOM 
3 new couches 
Wicker stand with all its ornaments 
Large tulip crate and doilies 
Wall pictures including large one 
Hanging plants 
FAMILY ROOM 
Family videos - Respondent's family 
Shelves with their ornaments 
Round table with chairs 
Share of children's photos and videos 
KITCHEN 
Half of pois and pans. plaves. cups silverware tic. 
Baking sheets and bowls. Recipe books 
Kitchen towels and miscellaneous cooking items 
RESPONDENTS OFFICE 
Picture frames, picture copies, frame samples 
Clothes in closet 
Brown vacuum cleaner 
PANTRY 
Some of church's canned food supplies 




Band saw machine 
All craft supplies including iron flower holder, Christmas greenery, ribbons and ribbon 
holder, spray cans, fabric remnants etc. 
GARAGE 
Table saw machine, some Christmas ornaments, gardening supplies, wood ladder. 
YARD 
Plant cuttings of her choosing. 
26. The Petitioner and Respondent should cooperate in the exchange and duplication of 
their children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the panies should collect the 
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both panies wish to 
have the same photo or video, a duplicate should be made and the panies should share the cost of 
duplication. 
27. All property acquired by the panies post-separation should be awarded to the person 
who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the property and 
holding the other pam' harmless thereon, with the exception of any and all non-contributory retirement 
benefits, which should be divided equally at the time of the entry of the final decree of divorce. 
Real Property: 
28. During the course of the marriage, the panies acquired a home and real property located 
at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City, Utah. 
29. Presently, the home has a value of at least Si 29,000 and has debt of S99.000, resulting 
in total equity of S30.000. Both panies should be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the 
marriage, or $15,000 each. 
30. As Respondent has no financial assets with which to reestablish a residence or build a 
future outside of those assets acquired during the marriage, it is reasonable and proper that she should 
be awarded the right to collect her 50% home equity interest from Petitioner should he decide to 
maintain possession of the marital home. 
31. Petitioner should have the opportunity to buy out the Respondent's 50% equity interest 
accrued during the marriage within thirty (30) days from the date of trial. Respondent should be 
awarded judgement against Petitioner in the amount of SI 5.000 which Petitioner should have the 
opportunity to satisfy by refinancing the marital residence or some other manner to satisfy 
Respondent's Si 5.000 judgment lien within 30 days from trial. If he is able to satisfy" her judgment 
interest. Petitioner should be awarded the home and real property as his sole and exclusive property, 
subject to him assuming and pa\ ing the mortgage obligation, all tax. insurance and maintenance due, 
and hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
32. If Petitioner is unable to satisfy Respondent's judgment lien after thirty' days from the 
trial date, men the home should be immediately placed on the open market for sale by a licensed real 
estate agent agreed to by the parties, at a price recommended by the real estate agent. .Any offer within 
five percent (5%) of the recommended listing price should be accepted by the parties, and the proceeds 
of the sale applied as follows: 
a. First, to pay expenses of sale: 
b. Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens; 
c. Then the balance remaining thereafter to be divided equally between the parties, 
whether or not that balance meets or exceeds the anticipated 530,000 equity interest 
Q 
stated herein. 
33. Both parties should be ordered to execute all necessary documents to effectuate the sale 
of said property as requested by any real estate agent, loan officer or title company agent. 
;34. In addition to the value of the home equity, Respondent is entitled to recoup from 
Petitioner 50% of the fire insurance proceeds from a fire which occurred in the marital residence in 
1998. After the panies separated, Petitioner received SI 7,404.58 as compensation for fire damage to 
the marital home and he has never accounted to Respondent for this amount. Insurance proceeds 
being a marital asset, Respondent is entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds collected by the 
Petitioner. Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner in the amount of S8.702.29. 
Alimonv: 
35. Presently, Petitioner earns an income more than double that of Respondent. His 
income earning history, except for 1998 when he was off work due to disability, shows he has always 
been the primary income earner beuveen die two panies. and has consistently and regularly earned the 
bulk of the household income. Over a five year period. Petitioner has earned approximately 76% of 
the combined marital income and Respondent has earned approximately 24% of the combined marital 
income, as shown below: 
should terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation 
to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's cohabitation or remarriage, Respondent's obligation to 
pay monthly child support will be revived. 
Pension and Retirement Assets: 
44. The Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of 
employment. Salt Lake County Corporation. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent receive 
50% of all benefits accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage up to the time of the entry of 
the final divorce decree and judgment, as Petitioner's retirement benefits are non-contributory in 
naaire. 
: 45. Respondent should be awarded any gains or losses on her 50% share of Petitioner's 
retirement benefits awarded to he: in this divorce action after the time of the entry of the final divorce 
decree. 
46. Petitioner should be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO) to effectuate such a division, and the parries should be ordered to share equally any costs 
charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the QDRO. 
47. Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than S600 since 
the parties." separation which should be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property. 
Restraining Order: 
48. Petitioner should be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place. 
^ j £ d judgment Jiid it u riLUijai} fui die odie. pony to cgirt mfnrrrrrnf of thn Cuuii'j) UIJLI, OIL IKHI-
defaulting n^ny <frnnlH tH*n ^p i i n H p ^ hir n» W nttnw^M'i fppr n H avpitnrpr n rhrinmnrr the 
^nfnrrnmont action against ;hc other partyr 
56. The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem just and appropriate 
in this matter. 
DATED this 2 _ day of 7U~v*UA*faU~
 j ^ r 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Ronald E. Nehrins Q 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebv certify that on the dav of _, 1999,1 caused to be delivered by 
fax and mail, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to the following: 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State St. 




MONICA Z. KELLEY (#7563) 
KELLEY & KELLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1000 Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
Fax: (801)531-6690 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD F. LOVATO, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ] 
PETRA LOVATO, : 
Respondent. 
AMENDED 
1 DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 974904424DA 
) Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
) Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned action came trial on September 3, 1999, the Honorable Ronald E. 
Nehring presiding. Trial continued to September 8, 1999 and concluded on September 10, 1999. 
Petitioner was present at all times and represented by counsel, Ronald C. Barker and Respondent was 
present at all times and represented by counsel, Monica Z. Kelley. The Court, having received 
evidence and heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses, and having considered the exhibits and 
reviewed the file and the pleadings on file herein, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is now therefore, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled matter on Ma\ 4. 
1998 wherein the parties were granted a decree of divorce based on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. This Amended Decree of Divorce serves to address all issues of custody, visitation, 
property division and support not addressed in the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce previously entered. 
2. The parties separated on or about August 16, 1997 and on that date as a practical 
matter, the parties' ended their economic partnership. Accordingly, the valuation of property and 
obligations shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date. 
Child Custody, Visitation and Support: 
3. The parties are hereby awarded the joint legal custody of the two minor children born 
as issue of this marriage: Christopher Julian Lovato, age 13 born April 18. 1986, and Alexander Daniel 
Lovato, age 11 born June 24, 1988, with the primary physical custody of the children awarded to the 
Petitioner, subject to Respondent's reasonable and liberal right to visit with the minor children. 
Petitioner and Respondent shall share the rights, privileges, duties and powers of a parenthood, 
pursuant to UCA 30-3-10.1 (1953 as amended). 
4. Visitation shall occur as the parties agree, with the Respondent having liberal and 
frequent access to the minor children. If they are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, then 
Respondent's visitation schedule shall not less than the schedule set forth under UCA 30-3-35. The 
parties shall further adhere to the Advisory Guidelines found in UCA 30-3-33 for their visitation and 
custody practices. 
5. Petitioner is employed by Salt Lake County Corporation and earns a monthly gross 
2 
income of $3, 153, which does not include compensation for his tool allowance or income from an\ 
other source. 
6. Respondent is employed by O.C. Tanner Company and earns a gross monthly income 
of $1,551, plus an additional $250 per month from her craft business, for a total combined monthh 
income of $1,801. 
7. Pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended) Respondent shall pay to 
Petitioner child support of $364.00 per month. 
8. Respondent's child support obligation shall continue until the youngest child becomes 
18 years of age, or has graduated from high school during the child's normal and expected year of 
graduation, whichever occurs later. Respondent's child support obligation shall be recalculated as 
provided for by law, and at minimum when the eldest child turns 18 years of age, or has graduated 
from high school during that child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later. 
9. Respondent's base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time 
periods during which a child is with the Respondent by order of the court or by agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the 
custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
10. Respondent shall pay her child support obligation to Petitioner one-half by the 5' da> 
of even' month and one half by the 20th day of even' month, or otherwise as the parties may agree 
11. Respondent has paid temporary child support through the pendency of this action aiu: 
has no child support arrearage owing. As Respondent is current in her child support obligation to 
Petitioner, automatic income withholding shall not be ordered. However, to further the convenience 
3 
of the parties, the Petitioner and Respondent mav coordinate the pajment of child support through 
automatic deposit to the recipient's bank account on a regular monthlv basis 
12. Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7.15, Petitioner shall maintain insurance for medical 
expenses for the benefit of the minor children, and Petitioner shall provide verification of coverage to 
the Respondent, along with enrollment information and participating care providers, to the Respondent 
each > ear by Januar> 2nd. The Petitioner shall notify the Respondent of an> change of insurance 
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date that Petitioner first knew or should 
have known of the change 
13. Both parties shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the health insurance premium 
actuall> paid by Petitioner for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount b> the number of the parties' children. Presentlv, 
Petitioner pays $151.19 per month for health and dental insurance coverage for the minor children 
and Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner her 50% obligation of S75 59 along with her monthlv child 
support pa> ment. 
14 Respondent's combined monthl} obligation to Petitioner for child support and 
insurance reimbursement shall be $439.69. 
15 Both parties shall share equall) all reasonable and necessan uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children and actualh paid b^  
the parties A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the co t^ a u 
pa> merit of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 davs of pavment 
16 Respondent shall pa> one half of all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
t 
expenses Petitioner has incurred during the pendency of this action, subject to Petitioner presenting to 
her verification of expenses actually paid. 
17. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with the 
above verification requirements. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations: 
18. Petitioner, shall assume and pay any and all outstanding debt as his sole and exclusi\ e 
obligation and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless on the following debts and obligations: 
a. Countrywide Home Mortgage - $100,156 for 1st home mortgage 
b. Salt Lake Credit Union - $9,398 for 2nd home mortgage 
c. John Paras Furniture: $869.52 for couch, stereo, vacuum and VCR 
d. Granite Furniture: $1,119.41 for carpet installed in marital home 
e. RC Willey: $656.83 for dining room set 
f. Salt Lake County Credit Union, $19,609.43 for motor vehicle loans 
19. Any debt listed in the Petitioner's bankruptcy petition and not otherwise provided for 
herein, shall be the sole and exclusive obligation of the Petitioner and he shall indemnify and hold the 
Respondent harmless thereon. 
20. The parties shall share equally the uninsured medical expenses totaling $4,560 fir 
hospital, dental and pharmacy bills for the minor children accrued during the marriage and prior to the 
parties separation. Respondent shall pay her one-half obligation toward theses expenses ($2,280) b\ 
reducing her lien on the marital home by that amount. 
5 
Provisions Relating to Personal Property: 
21. All personal property not the subject of debt described in Paragraph 18 herein, shall be 
distributed between the parties through an alternating selection to be first exercised by the Petitioner 
The distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by the parties and shall be supervised by counsel or 
counsel's designee. 
22. The Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in the exchange and duplication of their 
children's photographs and videos. Within thirty days from trial, the parties shall collect the 
photographs and videos and their possession and divide them as they choose. If both parties wish to 
have the same photo or video, a duplicate shall be made and the parties shall share the cost of 
duplication. 
23. All property acquired by the parties' post-separation shall be awarded to the person 
who acquired the property, subject to him or her assuming any and all debt related to the propem a* J. 
holding the other party harmless thereon. 
24. No joint bank, deposit or investment accounts are owned by the parties. Each part) 
shall be awarded his or her bank, deposit or investment account owned by him or her exclusi\el> a: 
the time of trial. 
Real Property: 
25. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real propem located 
at 5896 West Dixie Drive. West Valley City, Utah, which has a value of 5130,000. At the time of 
separation, the home had debt of SI09,554 from the first and second home mortgages, resulting v: 
total equity of $20,446. Each party shall be awarded 50% of the equity accrued during the marriage. 
6 
or $10,223. 
26. In 1998 Petitioner received insurance proceeds of SI 7,413.58 to compensate the panics 
for property damage caused by a fire in the marital home. The insurance proceeds are found to be a 
marital asset. The parties stipulated that Petitioner paid $2,500 from the insurance proceeds to pay for 
repair to the fire-damaged home, but the Petitioner failed to satisfactorily trace the balance of the 
insurance proceeds to expenses related to home repairs. 
27. Petitioner testified at trial that he used most of the insurance proceeds for his living 
expenses and bills while he was not working in 1998 due to illness, and that Respondent should not be 
entitled to recover any portion of the insurance proceeds since the work was, in fact, done and to 
award Respondent reimbursement of the unused insurance proceeds would be to reward her for the 
benefit of Petitioner's effort and relationships which were used in making the repairs to the home. 
28. At the time of the fire, Petitioner was living in the home by himself and Respondent 
had no control over how the repairs were done or who did them. Petitioner alone made that 
determination, and he chose to have them done at a discount and enjoyed the use of the insurance 
proceeds for his general support. 
29. At trial, Petitioner testified that all the home repairs had been done in the same manner 
as would a professional, only at no expense to him since the labor and materials were donated by 
friends and church members. He testified that the home was fully repaired and that paying someone to 
do the repairs or having them done at no cost resulted in the same condition, that the home was worth. 
SI30.000 repaired, and therefore it was his prerogative to use almost SI5,000 as he saw fit. 
30. The Court found that the $14,913.58 not expended for home repair is a marital asset 
7 
and as such it shall be divided equally between the parties. Therefore, Respondent is awarded 
$7,456.79, which equals one-half the value of the unused insurance proceeds. 
31. Respondent's ownership interest in the marital home is based on the home equity, 
unused fire insurance proceeds, minus her obligation for joint medical expenses as follows: 
50% of accrued equity + $10,223.00 
50% of unused insurance +$ 7,456.79 
Subtotal $17,679.79 
50% joint medical - $ 2,280.00 
Total $15,399.79. 
32. Respondent is awarded a lien against the marital home in the amount of $15,399.79. 
together with interest at the statutory post-judgment rate (presently 6.513% per annum). 
33. Petitioner shall immediately satisfy Respondent's lien upon the first of the following 
events to occur: 
a. The home is sold; 
b. The youngest child turns 18 and graduates high school, whichever occurs la:er: 
c. The minor children cease using the home as their primary residence; 
d. The Petitioner remarries or cohabitates; or 
e. The Petitioner uses the home as security for new debt or obtains refinancing on 
the home for any other purpose other than to satisfy Respondent's lien. 
34. Petitioner shall assume and pay any and all taxes, insurance, maintenance or other 
obligation related to the marital home and indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless thereon. 
8 
35. Respondent shall execute a special warranty deed subject to the lien described herein. 
Alimonv: 
36. Throughout the parties' marriage, Petitioner has been the primary income earner ot^ the 
household. He has always had a full-time job and presently is employed for Salt Lake City-
Corporation in its maintenance division where he has worked for over 11 years. 
37. He also worked at his side business of auto body repair and owned a body shop in 
Kearns, Utah that he has operated for approximately 10 years which is now closed following 
Petitioner's eviction from the site of the body shop. Respondent testified that he earned between 
SI,000 to $1,500 per month. Petitioner testified that the body shop had profitable years where he 
earned $10,000 after expenses. Petitioner testified the shop has not been profitable for him since 
1998. Petitioner testified he no longer operates the body shop and closed it a month before trial due to 
his health problems and the demands of single parenthood. Petitioner testified that the shop was 
usually profitable before 1997, but that due primarily to an illness, Petitioner lost customers and the 
business became unprofitable. 
38. Respondent also worked throughout the marriage, but on a much smaller scale. She 
had housecleaning jobs and also earned an income from her craft busines to support herself her 
hobbies and to contribute extra money to the family expenses. Respondent operates her craft business 
and earns S250 per month from the same. This is in addition to her income from her regular 
employment at OC Tanner, where she has earned S15.99S.15 including overtime, holiday pay. 
personal pay, profit sharing and vacation pay through August 21. 1999. Therefore. Respondent's 10CK 
gross monthly income includes $2,064 from OC tanner employment, plus S250 per month from her 
q 
craft business, for a total combined gross monthly income of $2,314. 
39. From Respondent's gross income of $2,314 per month, she has necessary deductions of 
$516.29 bringing her total net monthly income from all sources to $1,797.71. With approximately 
$1,800 in net income, Respondent has a need for alimony as her present reasonable expenses include: 
Respondent's Monthly Expenses 
IRent or Mortgage Payments (Residence) 
• Food and Household Supplies 
• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat 
• Telephone 
• Laundry and Cleaning 
• Clothing 
• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted) 
• Payment of Child, Spousal Support re: Prior Marriage 





1 Auto payments 
1 Insurance 
1 Gas 
1 Oil, Maintenance, Repair 
• Installment Payment(s) - Monthly Debts & Obligations 







• Children's Monthly Healin and Dental Insurance Premium 1 
• Other expenses not specifically requested above and specify below 
ITOTAL EXPENSES 
I 















I "5 5 r | 
•j ] 
] S1 .825 .75J 
40. Respondent's present monthly expenses are artificially low because her rent is S200 per 
month for a bedroom she rents in a home she shares with other adults and children. Both parties 
testified to the need for Respondent to obtain proper housing so she can take the minor children for 
overnight and extended visits. Because of her present housing situation, she is unable to visit with the 
children for any extended period of time. Respondent testified at trial that in order to obtain suitable 
housing for at least an apartment, she would pay rent of at least $500 to S600 per month. A reasonable 
rental payment would increase her present expenses by $300 to $400 per month and her home utilities 
would likely increase as well. 
41. Petitioner has the ability to assist Respondent with a monthly alimony payment. 
Petitioner testified at trial he receives a regular salary from his employer, and receives the same 
amount of pay every two weeks: $1,484.90. After deducting $30.00 per pay period for Petitioner's 
tool allowance, his gross monthly income of $3,253.00. 
42. Petitioner's monthly deductions from gross income for state and federal income taxes, 
life insurance, disability insurance, union dues are S400 per month. His health and dental insurance 
cost for himself and 50% of the boys' insurance is an additional $174.19. According to Petitioner's 
pay check stub Petitioner has little federal income tax withheld and his 1998 federal income tax return 
shows he had no tax liability for 1998. Petitioner has a deduction of $166.66 per month for "Flex 
Medical" which is his discretionary' medical savings account which the court does not consider to be a 
non-discretionary deduction from his gross income. 
43. Therefore, Petitioner's non-discretionary deductions as well as basic medical ana life 
insurance withholdings total $574.19 per month, and from the taxes withheld. Petitioner receives a 
refund from his income taxes withheld. Thus, Petitioner's net income totals at least $2,643.09 per 
month. Petitioner's net income of $2,643.09 plus child support and medical reimbursement of 
5439.69 yields a total net monthly income to $3,082.78. From this, Petitioner has monthh li\ ing 
expenses of S3.043. 
Petitioner's Monthly Living Expenses 
(Rent or Mortgage Payments (Residence) 
• Maintenance (Residence) 
• Food and Household Supplies 
• Utilities Including Water, Electricity, Gas and Heat 
• Telephone 
• Laundry and Cleaning 
• Clothing 
• Medical, Dental Insurance & Expenses (Exclude Payroll Deducted) 
• School Tuition, Activity Expenses 
• Entertainment (Includes Clubs, Social Obligations, Travel, Recreation) 
• Incidentals / Grooming 
• Bankruptcy Trustee Payment 
• Auto Expenses 
ITOTAL EXPENSES 











I 595 OCJ 
I 275 OCI 
l $3,043.001 
44. Petitioner's standard of living is higher than that of Respondent's. He has greater 
flexibility, even with his bankruptcy obligations, to reduce expenses, particularly transportation 
expenses. It is equitable to shift to Petitioner the responsibility for accommodating Respondem's need 
to obtain housing suitable to meet her parenting responsibilities. Although the Court has determined 
that there is insufficient factual basis to impute additional income to Petitioner based on his no. 
defunct auto body business, the Court is confident that he can generate income from this acti\n\. e\en 
on a hit and miss basis which, when coupled with a reduction in expenses, is more likely than no: to 
make it possible for Respondent to meet her legitimate housing needs through the payment of alinion;.. 
45. Accordingly. Petitioner shall pay Respondent alimony in the amount of S400 per month 
for a duration of time equal to the date of the parties' marriage through the time of trial, or 15 years. 
46. The Court acknowledges that this alimony award is insufficient to fully meet 
Respondent's living needs and will leave Petitioner pressed financially to meet this obligation if he 
does not generate as much supplemental business income as he has done in the past. However, the 
Court views Petitioner's obligation to assist in Respondent's support as a primary obligation over that 
of his obligation to his creditors in bankruptcy. As a matter of public policy, the Court expects the 
Respondent's monthly alimony payment is the first obligation of the Petitioner's to be met, because 
without the Respondent's efforts during the marriage, the Petitioner would not have a home or other 
property he enjoys today. 
47. This alimony award is reasonable because Petitioner has a longer work history and 
more marketable job skills than Respondent, he has the ability to generate a much greater income in a 
short amount of time when compared to Respondent's work history and job skills. Petitioner is a 45-
year-old man and is at the prime income earning stage of his career. 
48. Respondent, on the other hand, has entered the work force full time for the first time at 
the time of separation. She is a 47-year-old woman with limited work experience. Her work histor> 
throughout the marriage includes primarily house cleaning and crafting. 
49. An alimony award of S400 per month will allow the Respondent an opportunit} to 
equalize her standard of living to one comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage and will 
equalize the parties' respective incomes. 
50. Petitioner's monthly alimony payment shall be offset by Respondent's child support 
and insurance share payment of $439.69, resulting in a net monthly payment from Respondent to 
Petitioner of $39.69. This shall be paid by the Respondent one-half by the 5Ih day of each month, and 
one-half by the 20th day of each month. 
51. Petitioner's alimony obligation shall terminate upon Respondent's remarriage, 
cohabitation or death. Should Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony terminate due to Respondent's 
cohabitation or remarriage. Respondent's obligation to pay monthly child support shall be revived. 
Pension and Retirement Assets: 
52. Petitioner has a pension plan or other retirement benefits through his place of 
employment, Salt Lake County Corporation. Respondent shall be awarded 50% of all pension benefits 
accrued by Petitioner since the date of the marriage to August 16, 1997 pursuant to the Woodward 
formula. 
53. Petitioner shall be responsible for preparing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(QDRO) to effectuate the division of the retirement benefits as ordered herein, and the parties shall be 
ordered to share equally an\ costs charged by the retirement plan administrator to administer the 
QDRO, anticipated to be S250 total. 
54. Respondent has acquired a small 401(k) account with a value of less than $600 since 
the parties" separation which shall be awarded to her entirely as her sole and exclusive property. 
Restraining Order: 
55. Each party shall be permanently restrained from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening, or harming the Respondent at her residence, employment or any other place. 
Income Tax Provisions: 
56. The parties shall share equally the right to claim the minor children as dependents for 
income tax purposes. Beginning with their 1999 state and federal income tax filings, the parties shall 
coordinate their income tax return preparation and file their income tax returns by March 15th of every 
year. Prior to March 15l\ the parties shall cooperate in the exchange of the calculation of their income 
tax returns with and without the dependent exemptions and determine which party would receive'the 
greatest tax benefit from claiming the dependent exemption(s). The person with the greatest tax 
benefit shall claim the dependent exemption(s) in any given year. The person who claims the 
dependent exemption(s) shall isolate the value of the tax benefit attributed to the dependent exemption 
only, and the claiming part}' shall pay the non-claiming party 50% of the benefit received. 
57. The claiming party shall make payment to the non-claiming party within thirty (30) 
days of the receipt of any refund, or at the time the non-claiming party has tax due at the time of filing. 
whichever occurs first. 
58. Should this process prove to be too time consuming, expensive, or cumbersome for the 
parties based on their circumstances, the Court will entertain a Petition to Modify and make a direct 
award to the parties the right to claim one child or the other as a dependent for tax purposes. 
Attorney's Fees: 
59. Petitioner shall assume and pay his own attorney's fees, which have amounted to at 
least $8,040. 
60. As Petitioner is in the better financial position to pay Respondent's attorney's fees, he 
shall pay Respondent's attorney's fees and costs of SI 1,771 upon a showing of the reasonableness of 
the same. 
Maiden Name: 
61. The Court affirms Respondent's right to be restored the use of her former name of 
"Petra Martha Cano." 
Miscellaneous Provisions: 
62. Each party shall be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are 
required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
63. If either party defaults on his or her obligations as ordered in the decree of divorce and 
judgment and it is necessary for the other party to seek enforcement of the Court's order, the non-
defaulting party shall be awarded his or her attorney's fees and expenses for obtaining an enforcement 
order against the defaulting party. 
DATED this J L day oilt^^**^^ , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE HONORABLE RONALDM NEHRING 
Third District Court Judse 
Approved as to form 
/ _ DEPUTY CO'J~T CLERK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the V- day of fytfr/WL' 1999,1 delivered by fax and mail, a 
true and correct copy of the AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE to: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney at Law 
2870 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
-fXiMt ( V t e ^ f ^ -^L 
TabD 
y o^  \ ^ •" ^ — 
FILED D13TRIC? COL 
pistrict 
2000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH MAY 3 0 
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Electronically recorded on 
September 30, 1999 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING 
Third District Court Judge 
A.PPEARANCES : 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent: 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
SLC, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801)486-9636 
MONICA KELLEY 
9 Exchange Place 
Suite 1100 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-6686 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on September 30, 1999) 
3 THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and 
4 gentlemen. 
5 MR. BARKER: Good afternoon. 
6 THE COURT: We are here in Lovato versus 
7 Lovato, No. 974904424. Counsel, please state your 
8 appearances for the record. 
9 MR. BARKER: Ronald Barker for the petitioner 
10 MS. KELLEY: Monica Kelley for the respondent 
11 THE COURT: And we're here today for the 
12 purposes of me giving you my decision in this case. 
13 At the outset I want to thank both of you for taking 
14 seriously my invitation to send me disks. What I've 
15 done is used the disk and liberally exercised my 
16 editorial powers. 
17 Seems like we need one more. No, we don't. 
18 We've got them all. I don't want to keep the suspense 
19 up here or anything. Jill, could you make me another 
20 -- oh, wait. Oh, say it isn't so. Excuse me, I've 
21 got to do a little — 
22 COURT CLERK: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: Oops. This is my highest and 
24 best use as a Judge, what I'm doing right here. Maybe 
25 after you read this, you will agree. It may be useful 
-2-
1 to take out the proposed findings and conclusions 
2 that each of you prepared. What I expect to do as 
3 the agenda here is to just spend a little time not 
4 going over the whole thing in great detail, but to go 
5 over it and explain to you some of the high points of 
6 why I didn't adopt some of the things that each of you 
7 wanted me to adopt, and why I generally did. 
8 So Jill, could you distribute these; one to 
9 Ms. Kelley and one to Mr. Barker, and we'll be on our 
10 way here. Okay. Not much exciting, until we get to 
11 child support. What I did was the following. 
12 I determined that there was enough of a 
13 pattern in Ms. Lovato's supplemental craft business 
14 to include that. You'll see that in paragraph 9. So 
15 I gave her a gross monthly income for the purposes of 
16 support of $1,801. 
17 The only deduction from the stated gross 
18 I allowed to Mr. Lovato was the $30 tool allowance. 
19 You'll see that referenced in paragraph 8, and he 
20 has a total gross of $3,153, and this yields, by my 
21 calculation off the worksheet, a child support payment 
22 of $364. 
23 When we come to the business of insurance, 
24 it raises the question of how flex payments are to 
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Your Honor, you've given us no 
then? 
No, I've given you the credit for 
L stuff denominated as insurance; $151.19 a 
month, divided by — well, with the child's section 
taken out, for the total reimbursement of $439.69. 
MR. BARKER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Yes. Okay, let's see. The next 
contested item in — truly contested item in expenses 
were the unpaid medicals. I determined that I was 
satisfied that the presence of the medicals on the 
bankruptcy petition was satisfactory proof to me of 
their legitimacy. Accordingly I treated those as a 
marital debt and split them. 
The way I treated the personal property 
subject to indebtedness, furniture, RC Willey, so 
forth, is that I awarded that to Mr. Lovato, and 
1 assigned to him the responsibility for payment. Then 
2 what I did was take the rest of the personal property, 
3 and left it to be divided one — on an alternating 
4 basis. 
5 If you don't like that — and I would 
6 imagine that nobody likes that — you're certainly 
7 welcome to stipulate to any kind of property, personal 
8 property distribution that you choose. 
9 I've also in paragraph 29 indicated that 
10 the distribution shall occur at a time agreed upon by 
11 the parties and shall be supervised by Counsel or 
12 Counsel's designees. I want somebody there who's 
13 keeping the peace, if nothing else. 
14 Real property is another troublesome area, 
15 I guess. Here's what I did and why I did it. The 
16 most contentious issue is insurance proceeds. What 
17 I determined was one, the insurance proceeds was a 
18 marital debt — I mean, a marital property, and that 
19 because Mr. Lovato had unilateral control over that 
20 property, that he had a concomitant obligation to 
21 account for that, and that I was not satisfied with 
22 the accounting that I received. 
23 Therefore, what I did was reduce the amount 
24 of insurance by the stipulated out-of-pocket payments 
25 made by Mr. Lovato, divide the balance, and include 
1 that in the equity of the home to be distributed — 
2 awarded to Ms. Lovato. 
3 I'm looking for the paragraph that's going 
4 to indicate what the — okay, paragraph 41. "Total 
5 award to respondent for her interest in the marital 
6 home equity of $10,223, and unused insurance proceeds 
7 of $7,456.79 total $17,679.79. When adjusted for 
8 respondent's share of joint medical expenses, the net 
9 property award is $15,399.79." 
10 I decline the invitation to reduce this to a 
11 judgment. It will remain a lien, but it will however 
12 bear interest at the judgment rate. I've adopted the 
13 petitioner's view that documentation of this should be 
14 through warranty deed subject to the reservation of 
15 the lien. 
16 Alimony. This is a very difficult issue, 
17 and going to the bottom line I've determined that 
18 an alimony award is appropriate here. Probably the 
19 pivotal paragraph -- although it's a little prolix as 
20 I read it over, and certainly could have been stated 
21 more succinctly -- is found in paragraph 53, which I 
22 note the petitioner's standard of living was higher 
23 than the respondent's. I note that he has greater 
24 flexibility, even with the bankruptcy obligation, to 



























It's my view that it's equitable to shift 
to petitioner the responsibility for accommodating 
respondent's need to obtain housing suitable to meet 
her parenting responsibilities. It was the housing 
expense of Ms, Lovato that was most troubling to me 
as being in my view totally out of line with what an 
individual could be expected to pay for housing and 
create a suitable environment for kids. 
I note that although I've determined there 
is insufficient factual basis to impute additional 
income to Mr. Lovato based on his now defunct auto 
body business, I hasten to note that I'm confident 
that he can generate income from this activity, even 
on a hit and miss basis, which when coupled with the 
reduction of his expenses is more likely than not to 
make it possible for respondent to meet her legitimate 
housing needs through alimony. 
In other words, I credited the testimony 
concerning state of Mr. Lovato's auto body business, 
and declined to impute income, but I hedged that. I 
hedged it to the extent that I think that there is — 
that Mr. Lovato is capable of generating in some way 
auto body work on an ad hoc basis additional income, 
because there is a track record sufficient when 
1 coupled with adjustments and expenses to meet the $400 
2 alimony payment. 
3 Now, the $400 should come as no secret. 
4 It comes from taking the $200 expense listed by 
5 Ms. Lovato for housing, and adding $400 to reach 
6 the $600 that I thought was reasonable for housing to 
7 create an environment suitable to have those kids on 
8 the scene. So there it is. 
9 I didn't net this out, I notice, but if you 
10 do the netting, it comes out, I don't know, probably 
11 Mr. Lovato's got to pay $40 a month or something. 
12 Actually I can't remember how it comes out. I think 
13 Ms. Lovato pays — with insurance it's — so there's a 
14 net obligation from Ms. Lovato to Mr. Lovato. 
15 To the extent that these findings reflect 
16 the reverse, as paragraph 58 reflects, I'll make note 
17 of this. I'm going to make a change in the final 
18 edition. I thought — I would hope this would be the 
19 final edition, but it's obviously not. 
20 Tne pension plan business was m my opinion 
21 unremarkable. I don't think that there's anything 
22 remarkable about it. I decline to touch the $600. 
23 Well, I guess it is remarkable m the sense that you 
24 will see that throughout I've adopted the date of 
25 the separation as the operative date for virtually 
-8-
1 everything. 
2 Paragraph 3, I've determined that the date 
3 of separation, August 16, 1997 is a date which as a 
4 practical matter ended parties' economic partnership 
5 -- and we'll do a little correction there — and 
6 accordingly the valuation of property and obligation 
7 shall be fixed to the extent possible as of that date. 
8 So I may be a slave to consistency there, 
9 but I've decided that that's the date and those are 
10 the reasons. That's the reason why I did that. 
11 Because part of the economic partnership between 
12 the parties included retirement, that's when the 
13 retirement is valued as well. 
14 Okay. Then the final big ticket argument, 
15 or potentially, are attorney's fees. I've determined 
16 that there is a need, that Mr. Lovato is in a better 
17 position to pay. I've received some affidavit of 
18 attorney's fee papers from Ms. Kelley. 
19 In seems appropriate that before I enter 
20 any aware concerning amounts of attorney's fees, 
21 that Mr. Barker be given an opportunity to challenge 
22 reasonableness, and I'll leave that for another day. 
23 I will entertain questions if you have questions. 
24 Questions, but not debate. I'd be happy to explain 
25 things tc ^ou. 
-9-
MS, KELLEY: On attorney's fees, your Honor, 
at the trial we stipulated that each fee submitted at 
the time of trial were reasonable. Do you expect a 
hearing on attorney's fees or — 
THE COURT: I think that under — what's 
the case — In re: Quinn or Quinn versus Quinn or 
something — that a party should be afforded an 
opportunity to challenge reasonableness if they want 
to. 
To be honest with you, it slipped my mind 
that there had been a stipulation to that. If it's a 
done deal, as far as you're concerned, and if there is 
a stipulation, maybe that ends the inquiry. 
MR. BARKER: I think what we stipulated to 
was that the services original for what we've done, 
but we haven't stipulated the fees were necessary, and 
there are various aspects of the case that were just 
churning fees and really unnecessary. 
THE COURT: Well, I would think there are 
questions there of who was the churner and who was the 
churnee, and I guess what I'd like to do is give you a 
chance to nake your respective pitches to me on that 
separately, because you know, it has the potential, 
given the financial resources of these people, to be 
a big deal. Probably second only to the equity in 
-10-
the house. So I'm more comfortable giving you your 
date in Court on that question than doing something 
dramatic. 
MS. KELLEY: So you anticipate a hearing 
or Mr. Barker responding to my filings and having a 
hearing? 
THE COURT: Well, I think only if he wants 
it. I mean, your filings may be so compelling and 
persuasive on the issue of reasonableness that we 
don't need a hearing. I mean, miracles do happen. 
So we may not need one, and we might. 
MS. KELLEY: Then just for clarification, it 
looks like paragraph 17 calculates that child support 
and insurance would be $439.69, which would result in 
a net monthly payment to Mr. Lovato for about $40. 
THE COURT: Right. I think that's true, and 
I'll try to clean up the paragraph that I didn't clean 
up that suggests to the contrary back here someplace. 
MR. BARKER: As a practical matter, your 
Honor, if the judgment is entered against Mr. Lovato 
for attorney fees, there's no way he can pay them, in 
a lump sum, certainly, and we need to do something as 
a practical matter or he will file another bankruptcy. 
We don't want to have that happen. His 
resources are so strained now. I v/ould suggest the 
-11-
Court reconsider and that each party pay their own 
attorney's fees. She's got no one to care for except 
herself. He's got two kids to care for. 
THE COURT: Well, one thing you might want to 
give me a look at is whether I have within my power in 
divorce cases the power to control the way fees are 
paid, just as an example. I mean, use your creative 
minds here. 
What you're hearing me say is I'm unlikely 
to back off any of this, but I'm certainly amenable to 
considering modifications on the margins. So let me 
say it again for point of reference. 
The big ticket items here are cast in stone. 
I've given this a lot of thought. So I'm wetted to 
the major issues, and they're done deals unless and 
until they go to the fifth floor, but I'm certainly 
willing to consider suggestions on the margins, on the 
details. 
Now, before we adjourn I just want to tell 
you that I thought despite the clear and profound 
misrepresentation that this was going to take a half 
a day, that — and here I'm talking to the parties — 
that, you know, your lawyers did a good job here. 
No question about it, and they laid out the issues 
in great detail and were very persuasive about the 
-12-
1 important points. I'm always appreciative of that. 
2 The work product that I received in the form of 
3 proposed findings and conclusions were very helpful. 
4 MS. KELLEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: We're adjourned. 






















STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss • 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under 
my direction from the transmitter records made of 
these meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, 
and contains all of the evidence and all matters 
to which the same related which were audible 
through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested 
in the outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in 
the record, and therefore, the name associated 
with the statement may not be the correct name as 
to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 30th day of 
May 2000. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
-^ ' \ ^ f / V ^ 
Beveriy Lowe 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
EDWARD F. LOVATO, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 974904424 
vs. : 
PETRA LOVATO# : 
Respondent. : 
Petitioner filed a Notice to Submit Motion for a New Trial or 
to Correct Findings & Decree on December 28, 1999. I have not 
previously addressed this Notice to Submit because I intended my 
Minute Entry of November 4, 1999 to address all issues raised in 
the pleading entitled "Petitioner's Objections to Proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and to Divorce Decree." 
I have taken this opportunity to review again the contents of 
petitioner's Motion with respect to what petitioner has 
characterized as, incorrectly in my view, an offset of alimony 
against child support. Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive and 
his Motion is denied. 
LOVATO V. LOVATO PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
Respondent's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this .day of March 
RONAI^5E%* 
DISTRI^  y^^n^s/ 
«7 ^ 
LOVATO V. LOVATO PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this **? day of March, 
2000: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2870 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Monica Z. Kelley 
Attorney for Respondent 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
l/WAnu^ 
TabF 
Form BJ£ Continued 
(9/97) 
EXPLANATION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
IN A CHAPTER 7 CASE 
This court order grants a discharge to the person named as the debtor. It is not a dismissal of the case and 
it does not determine how much money, if any, the trustee will pay to creditors. 
Collection of Discharged Debts Prohibited 
The discharge prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged. For 
example, a creditor is not permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to file or continue a lawsuit, to 
attach wages or other property, or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from the debtor. [In a case 
involving community property:] [There are also special rules that protect certain community property owned by the 
debtor's spouse, even if that spouse did not file a bankruptcy case.] A creditor who violates this order can be 
required to pay damages and attorney's fees to the debtor. 
However, a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, 
against the debtor's property after the bankruptcy, if that lien was not avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy case. 
Also, a debtor may voluntarily pay any debt that has been discharged. 
Debts That are Discharged 
The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor's legal obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most, 
but not all, types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date the bankruptcy case was filed. (If this case 
was begun under a different chapter of the Bankruptcy Code and converted to chapter 7, the discharge applies to 
debts owed when the bankruptcy case was converted.) 
Debts That .are Not Discharged 
Some of the common types of debts which are not discharged in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case are. 
a. Debts for most taxes; 
b. Debts that are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; 
c. Debts for most student loans; 
d. Debts for most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal restitution obligations; 
e. Debts for personal injuries or death caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated; 
f. Some debts wiiich were not properly listed by the debtor; 
g. Debts that the bankruptcy court specifically has decided or will decide in this bankruptcy case are not 
discharged; 
h. Debts for which the debtor has given up the discharge protections by signing a reaffirmation agreement 
in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code requirements for reaffirmation of debts. 
This information is only a general summary of the bankruptcy discharge. There are exceptions to 
these general rules. Because the law is complicated, you may want to consult an attorney to determine the 
exact effect of the discharge in this case. 
